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The Employment Recruitment and Promotion Process: Legal regulation and 
practice   
Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
Recruitment is an integral part of any organization. It forms the foundation upon which every 
other practice is built. It is a process which is often regarded lightly and not given the due 
consideration it deserves. It is therefore pertinent to have a recruitment process in place which 
ensures legal compliance, as well as the longevity of the business.  
The concept of legal compliance in the employment recruitment and promotion process has 
proved at best inconspicuous. The process has allowed for much legal debate, which spans from 
the CCMA all the way through to the Constitutional Court. The process has also allowed for 
much jurisprudence to be developed regarding the implementation and application of the statutes 
governing it. 
This dissertation will focus on the limitations placed on management prerogative by labour law 
the procedural and substantive fairness requirements. It will do so by exploring case law, risk 
management measures and what is required to ensure a contract of employment is legal and 
binding on both parties.  
It is important to read this dissertation in the light of how labour law overlaps with and impacts 
on management prerogative. This view is necessary to understand how the push-pull dynamic 
between these two factors in recruitment and promotion have molded the process to encompass 
issues that substantively outweigh their procedural counterparts and vice versa.  
It is necessary in this dissertation to expound on the fundamental law governing the recruitment 
and promotion process and will explore concepts of management prerogative, amongst others.  
The objective of this dissertation is to investigate the ambiguities imposed by procedural and 
substantive fairness and will venture into risk management measures and contractual obligations 




1.1 Regulating managerial prerogative 
 
(a) What is meant by the term managerial prerogative? 
 
The word prerogative indicates a right or privilege exclusive to a particular individual or class.1  
In BTR Dunlop Ltd v National Union of Metalworkers of SA the court expounds prerogative in 
the labour context as 'the right to trade includes the right to manage that business, often referred 
to as the managerial prerogative.'2 Strydom3 in her article submits that the term prerogative is 
most commonly found in constitutional and labour law. Constitutionally it refers to the discretion 
conferred to the state and the authority which it holds. This discretion however is limited by the 
common law. As it is the organ which both gives expression to and yet at the same time limits 
the discretion. In the context of labour the prerogative refers to the discretionary ‘right to 
manage’ an organization. She asserts that prerogative in this sphere has two categories of 
decision making: Category one refers to decision making pertaining to human resources. 
Category two refers to decisions which are economic or business in nature. She submits that an 
overlap often occurs between the two categories, where a required decision in one category will 
affect another. For instance, decisions such as relocation or new investments often have a direct 
impact on job security. Prerogative is quite broad in one-person operations.  
 
Companies, being juristic persons, are obliged to exercise their prerogatives as employers 
through natural persons. A company’s   powers are normally exercised through its board of 
directors. Directors can then elect to delegate power. Management of the company would then 
encompass the directorate as well as those to whom power has been delegated.    
Close Corporations are juristic persons consisting of between one to ten members. The 
managerial power in this instance is original in nature and the members can delegate their power 
or members may choose to exercise prerogative personally.  
Management in the private and public sectors is normally comprised of a collection of managers 
which form a hierarchy with varying and cumulative levels of decision making power as one 
travels higher up the hierarchy. Davies and Fredland summarise the need for decision makers as 
                                               
1 See Angus Stevenson, Oxford Dictionary of English 3 ed (2010) sv prerogative 
2 See BTR Dunlop Ltd v National Union of Metalworkers of SA (1992) 13 ILJ (IC) (2) supra note 8 at 705C 
3 Strydom EML ‘The Origin, Nature and Ambit of Employer Prerogative (Part 1)’ (1999) 
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follows: “Except in a one man undertaking, economic purposes cannot be achieved without 
hierarchical order within the economic unit”4. The prerogative conferred on managers which 
allows them to manage employees finds its origin in the power balance between the two parties. 
As Strydom submits, the employer normally commands capital, information and access to legal 
advice, whereas the employee works in order that he or she may survive. This power monopoly 
experienced as an advantage by the employer does not however provide a legal right to the 
employer to manage employees. Neither is the converse applicable to employees in terms of 
them obeying instructions. Strydom submits that the employer prerogative finds its legal 
foundation in the contract of employment.  
 
The pluralist view is that an employer’s prerogative can be limited by collective bargaining. 
Employer prerogative is strengthened when the economy is weakest as a weak economy results 
in a scarcity of jobs, as submitted by Flanders.5 It is submitted that employers have found that a 
unitarist approach may harm business. This is especially the case where employees are 
represented by a well-organized trade union. Employers have therefore subsequently adopted a 
pluralist view of industrial relations, which has been incorporated into labour legislation which 
affords employees the right to associate in trade unions and which also promotes collective 
bargaining. Apart from this Strydom submits that employer prerogative is also limited in a 
number of ways in the common law. For instance an employer may not unilaterally alter the 
terms and conditions of employment stipulated in the contract of employment. The prerogative is 
also limited by a plethora of statutes which include, but are not limited to the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act, the Occupational Health and Safety Act and the Labour Relations Act. 
Strydom concludes her article with the submission that the employers’ prerogative is comprised 
of those decisions that the law allows and which trade unions are content to leave at the 
employers’ discretion, or those decisions which the trade union has been unable to subject to 






                                               
4 Davies P, Freedland M ‘Kahn-Freunds labour Law and the Law’ 3ed (1983) at 18 
5 Flanders A ‘Management and Unions: The Theory and Reform of Industrial Relations’ (1970) at 136-139 
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(b) where this concept comes from; 
 
Storey6 in his book analyses managerial prerogative. He submits that that there are two key 
strands of middle class ideology, namely private property rights and the rights of contract. He 
further defines the managerial prerogatives in relation to related terms of ‘management rights’ 
and ‘management functions’. The rights function is normally derived from property rights of 
ownership of plant and equipment with manager’s acting as trustees for the legal owners. 
However preservation of managerial functions is more related to a demarcation claim. It relates 
to functional tasks which helps give this occupational class its distinctiveness. These tasks relate 
to the control functions and this therefore delineates the occupational group horizontally and 
vertically, therefore maintaining a hierarchical division of labour. The spirit of managerial 
prerogative pervades a wide realm of managerial thinking and assertiveness. 
 
One example is the Conservative Party of the United Kingdom which had, in the 1960s, an 
idealistic hope of incorporating and defining managerial prerogatives in their Code of Good 
Practice, thus indicating their support of the doctrine. They made the following submission: 
“Their fundamental prerogatives – so often the subject of dispute and disruptive negotiation – 
would be clearly set out in the Code of Good Practice. These would become recognized and 
established principles – whether or not management rights were incorporated in a collective 
agreement.”7 This was however never included in the final code.  
 
Management control has been seen to tie into the question of management control over the 
labour process. Storey submits that in all countries and in all social systems control was the 
essential managerial function, since the earliest days of nascent industrialism. He further submits 
that despite the ‘managerial problem’ of recruitment, there was a further problem of developing 
and sustaining a disciplined and industrial workforce. John Woodward sees management 
ideology as serving “a positive function in sustaining management as a social institution.”8 
Historically the emergence of managerial prerogative was prompted by the new circumstances 
                                               
6 Storey J “Managerial Prerogative and the Question of Control” (1983) Redwood Burn Ltd 
7 Conservative Political Centre (1968), ‘Fair Deal at Work, The Conservative Approach to Modern Industrial 
Relations’, Conservative Political Centre, London  
8 Woodward J, ‘Industrial Organisation: Theory and Practise’, (1965) Oxford University Press 
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prevailing in nascent industrial capitalism. Storey submits that the doctrine of ‘managerial 
prerogative’ attempts to lay claim to wide ranging rights. And its emergence historically was 
prompted by new circumstances which prevailed in the future potential of industrial capitalism. 
The idea of prerogatives was something which was already partially formed, for instance royal 
prerogative has been imposed for centuries. In this day and age ‘managerial prerogative’ is more 
of an emotive term that often leads to misunderstandings. For instance in trade union circles it 
can raise suspicions and protests that the user is implying support of unilateral managerial action. 
Although it may be wise to exclude the term from all forms of collective bargaining, the use of 
the term can be a useful shorthand phrase for an important element in collective bargaining 
situations. Wood defines managerial prerogatives as “the name for the remaining portion of 
managements original authority and is therefore the name for the residue of discretionary 
powers left at any moment in the hands of managers. Every act which a manager or his 
subordinates can lawfully do, and without the consent of the worker organization is done by 
virtue of this prerogative.”9  
 
Storey submits that there are 4 pillars on which managements view on managerial prerogative 
rests. The first stems from the rights attached to ownership of the property and managers as 
owners must have control of their own capital assets and this concept is derived from the 
common law. The second rests on the statutory law of ownership responsibility and this 
responsibility has been claimed to be the reason why authority must be concentrated in 
management hands. The third is the ‘economic efficiency’ argument, which contains various 
strands that all seem to argue that it is in everyone’s interests, everyone being consumers, 
shareholders, the nation, and workers that managers be left to manage as they see fit. The fourth 
centers on the notion that there are persons who are naturally identifiable as ‘leaders’ and others 
who perform best when led. The trade unions view refers not so much to a right but more a duty 
of management to do the job for which they are paid. The trade unions congress made the 
following statement: “is management’s job to lead… what is required is not a diminution in 
managerial authority but a new conception of how this authority should be exercised”10  
                                               
9 Wood, LC, “A study of managerial prerogatives as a system  of ideas” unpublished Phd Thesis, University of 
Wisconsin 
10 Trade Unions Congress (1967), ‘Trade Unionism’, TUC, London 
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Managerial prerogative is a concept well entrenched in history and in the minds of management, 
workers and trade union alike. The concept has been established and cultivated by industrialism 
and capitalism and has roots which ensure its longevity and existence in the working relationship 
for as long as this relationship will exist.  
 
(c) Critics  of the concept 
 
Jordaan11 in his article submits that ownership of or control of industrial capital does not give the 
employer a legal right to or power to ‘manage’ employees or exercise control over them. This 
right to control property only extends to the objects owned or controlled and does not extend to 
the right to manage or control persons. This right to manage and direct the employees’ labour is 
derived from contractual justification. However contract theory alone does not provide adequate 
explanation for the right to manage. The hallmarks of contract are equality and liberty. By 
regarding the employers right to manage the law of contract has legitimized that control as 
having been consented to by the employee. Aside from that statutes were built which 
criminalized breaches of contract by employees, making such breaches punishable by fines and 
imprisonment. This was finally repealed in 1974 in South Africa.  
 
Jordaan submits that, amongst others, socialization of the law is a limitation on managerial 
prerogative. Socialization entails a process of legislative and administrative intervention that 
strips the legal institutions regulating private property of their unitary, private and individual 
centered character. He refers to the following quote by Pound  
“Those who conceive that the law is entering upon a new stage of development…speak of that 
stage…as a stage of socialization of law (with) the emphasis upon social interests; upon the 
demands or claims or desires involved in social life rather than upon the qualities of the abstract 
man in vacuo or upon the freedom of the isolated individual… (W)e think of law not negatively 
as a system of hands off while individuals assert themselves freely, but positively as a social 
institution existing for social ends. Thinking thus (the question becomes) what claims or 
demands or want of society are involved in such a controversy?”12  
                                               
11 Jordaan B, ‘Managerial Prerogative and Industrial Democracy’ (1991) 11 Industrial Relations, pp 2 
12 Pound “The Spirit of the Common Law” (1931) Boston: Marshall Jones, pp. 195, 197 
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The employment relationship offers the best illustration of the socialization process. Statutory 
developments and interventions have sought to protect the employees against arbitrary exercise 
by employers and have superimposed the interests of society over the powers and activities 
traditionally regarded as part of the employers domain.  
 
The unfair labour practice concept has impinged on areas traditionally regarded as falling within 
the management’s prerogative, e.g. the denial of access to trade union to conduct a strike ballot.  
Employee’s individual employment rights have served as further limitation on managerial 
prerogative. The concept of unfair dismissal is entrenched in the fact that employee’s 
employment is more than an entitlement to wages. This is a concept which was well developed 
by the industrial court in the 1980’s. The employer’s contractual rights extend only as far as the 
duties and responsibilities to which the employee has agreed and signed. Therefore the employer 
cannot unilaterally change conditions of employment or compel the employee to accept and 
carry out an instruction which is unlawful and unreasonable. The employer views the 
developments in Industrial Relations as having curtailed their management prerogative. However 
the industrial courts have stressed that it will not get involved in the running of the employers 
business so long as the employer is acting in good faith. Only in the area of dismissals for 
misconduct or incompetence/incapacity will the court get involved to test the merits of the 
decision to terminate.13 
 
Jordaan submits that managerial prerogative or the right to manage is ill defined, however it is a 
right that is fundamentally restricted, both in the interests of employees and society at large. He 
further submits that the right to manage is motivated and supported by economic and other 
factors outside the legal framework and this is what gives the employer its bargaining strength. 
Also the empowering of employees by means of rights and sanctions equaling the employer in 
the legal or economic terms does not derogate nor create a basis for employers to believe their 
right to manage nugatory. Jordaan submits that a principled reliance on managerial prerogative is 
a unitarist approach and power-centered in its conception and execution. He submits that 
                                               




unitarism cultivates an adversarial industrial relations climate; whereas, a pluralist approach 
fosters joint decision making and economic cooperation.  
 
 
(d) The meaning of managerial prerogative in SA today. 
 
Thomson14 in his article submits that there is effectively no such thing as managerial prerogative. 
His reason for this submission is because some labour law systems globally submit that there are 
certain matters over which unions have no say, for instance, an investment decision. However 
the same does not apply in the South African context as the union can push for a collective 
agreement on ‘any matter of mutual interest between the employer and employee’ and the 
union/employees can engage in a protected strike in support of such. He submits that it is this 
right to strike or alternatively litigate on anything impacting the employment relationship, as the 
signal to the absence of managerial prerogative in our system of labour law. As no employer 
decision affecting employment is immune. However he further submits that our system is 
characterized by voluntarism. And although unions can negotiate on any matter in employment, 
the employer generally still holds the most power and therefore generally has their way. That is a 
function of power not law. 
 
He submits that an operational requirements dismissal falls outside the ambit of collective 
bargaining in that it is a rights issue. This is because operational requirements are economic and 
not legal in nature. Work practices can be unilaterally altered however, work practices can be 
transformed into conditions of service, or, more generally, bargaining matters. And if 
management gives consensus, then the conversion has occurred. And the reverse is possible, 
which means that management can bargain for more unilateral action space. He submits that a 
dispute over restructuring which could include a host of matters such as, mergers, relocations and 
downsizing, amongst others. And circumstances may be altered, for instance, the employer may 
wish employees to work differently and that may include changes to conditions of service. This 
                                               




resulting management engagement on change should take the form of bargaining (unless it is 
managed under a broader consultative process).  
 
However retrenchment as a response to deteriorating market conditions would not form part of 
this category. Despite this, if job losses come into question: “power may not be used to effect or 
resist dismissals; the dismissals if disputed must be adjudicated; and the employer must be able 
to show the Labour Court that the operational requirements of the business justify the envisaged 
business changes and consequent job losses.”15 This indicates that management prerogative is 
intact when it comes to issues of economics affecting the business. When dismissals are 
contemplated, if they are not being proven to be done for fair reasons then the prerogative can be 
curtailed. Therefore as Thomson argues, the underlying issue in dispute remains essentially 
economic. However there is not a clear right or wrong answer to the question of whether a 
business change is necessary to the point of justifying a dismissal. Also the courts instinctively 
avoid involving themselves where a business line decision needs to be made, and they therefore 
give employers a hefty grace in making a decision based on economic merits. So effectively, as 
long as the employer can prove the economic merits of decisions to dismiss then the employer’s 
prerogative will be intact and undefeated.  
 
1.2 The extent to which the law limits managerial prerogative in the recruitment process 
The common law gave employers unlimited rights and unhindered managerial prerogative via 
the law of contract. The employer also had the prerogative to hire whoever it wanted and 
effectively fire whoever it didn’t want. However the development of statute has significantly 
restricted the employer prerogative. For instance the Employment Equity Act includes in its 
definition of employee an applicant for employment. This is a fundamental submission to the 
limitation of the employer prerogative as this offers certain rights to a job applicant rights such 
as, the chapter two right not to be unfairly discriminated against whether directly or indirectly. 
Section 187 of the Labour Relations Act describes unfair labour practices as encompassing 
unfair conduct by the employer which relates to amongst others, the promotion, of an employee. 
This curtails the employers prerogative relating to promotions as this is normally a grey area and 
one in which recruitment best practices are often overlooked. It serves to regulate unfair 
                                               
15 Ibid pg 762  
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promotions. The challenge in the recruitment and promotion process however is that selections 
are normally done confidentially. This means that the results are potentially not compliant with 
statutory requirements and applicants fall victim to such misdemeanors as favoritism and 
nepotism, amongst others. Clarity with regard to statutory compliance is therefore necessary as 
even applicants for jobs can challenge employer’s employment decisions.  
 
1.3 Applicable legislation  
Almost all legislation impacts on the process of recruitment and promotion in some way, shape 
or form. The Constitution specifies that everyone has the right to fair labour practices as well as 
an inherent right to dignity. The Occupational Health and Safety Act specify that an employer 
must provide a safe work environment for employees. However the legislation which I will be 
focusing on in this dissertation is the Labour Relations Act and the Employment Equity Act. 
Chapter 8 of the Labour Relations Act deals with unfair treatment in the workplace and more 
specifically unfair labour practices. The act defines unfair labour practices as “Unfair conduct of 
an employer relating to the promotion, demotion, probation or training of an employee or the 
provision of benefits.”16 
The aforementioned synchronizes succinctly with the Employment Equity Act chapter one 
definition of an employee which includes an applicant for employment in its definition. The act 
further mandates the prohibition of unfair discrimination in any employment policy or practice 
on any listed17 or arbitrary ground. 
 
1.4 Methodology  
The methodologies employed in the writing of this dissertation are desk based and case study 
methods. The desk based study involved a great deal of online research as well as the sourcing of 
external library materials such as books and articles, as well as published government 
                                               
16 The Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, S186(2)(a) 
17 The Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 , S6(1)… “including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, family 
responsibility, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, HIV status, conscience, 
belief, political opinion, culture, language, birth….” 
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documents, such as statutes. These books, articles and statutes have been used to research the 
origin and need for recruitment and promotion best practices. The second component of research 
methodology is that of case study focusing on the analyses of various case law, policies and 
decisions which affect and have affected the evolution of the recruitment and promotion process.  
1.5 Limitations of dissertation  
The limitations of this dissertation are that it will not cover the various forms of employment, 
namely; fixed term contracts of employment, indefinite contracts of employment, part time 
contracts of employment and also labour brokering. It also will not cover the post placement 
process, such as, the statutory or contractual terms of probation, amongst others, as well as the 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act and its effects on the recruitment and promotion 
process.  
Chapter 2:  Procedural fairness in recruitment 
Procedural fairness can be considered the right of an employee in respect of the procedure 
followed in the process of discipline or dismissal. Procedural fairness is important because it 
ensures an employee an opportunity to state their case and defend themselves in light of 
allegations brought against them. It also ensures that the employer is consistent in the 
administration of its disciplinary procedures and practices to ensure that no favourtism or 
nepotism takes place and therefore compromises the procedure.   
2.1 What does procedural fairness entail? 
 
 2.1.1 Does an employer have to advertise every vacancy? 
 
There is no law which says that a job has to be advertised before it can lawfully be offered to a 
person.  It is possible to imagine many situations where advertising is not necessary or 
appropriate: 
 in a small family business, where a parent appoints a son or daughter to a position 
in the business; 




 in a company where an individual has been employed on a casual basis for an 
extended period and now a permanent position has become available; 
 where a company offers a permanent position to a person who has completed a 
learnership (apprenticeship / articles of clerkship) with the company and it 
is impressed by the person; 
 where a holiday student intern impresses the company and it makes a direct 
approach to her /him; 
 where friends decide to start a business together; 
 where the costs of advertising are not warranted. 
 
Despite the fact that there are no laws requiring advertising of vacancies, there may 
nevertheless be sound reasons to advertise as a matter of policy. These reasons include: 
 in large enterprises the employer may not be able to predict which existing 
employee might want to apply for an available post as promotion; 
 the employer in a large enterprise might expose itself to an allegation of unfair 
labour practice in its promotion policy if it does not advertise vacancies; 
 governmental departments and public bodies are obliged to abide by the rules of 
administrative fairness, which include openness, transparency, a lack of bias, an 
obligation to avoid nepotism18, a duty to make decisions which are rational and 
fair; 
 in a democracy it is important that not only elected officials are accountable, but 
also that appointed officials are qualified to perform public functions and will do 
so without corruption. A process of advertising helps create the perception that 
public bodies are open and accountable; 




                                               
18"Nepotism" is defined as favouritism in appointment or advancement based on family relationship. 
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2.1.2 Do all applicants have to be shortlisted and interviewed? 
 
The Employment Equity Act defines a suitably qualified individual as having one or a 
combination of the following; a formal qualification, prior learning, relevant experience, capacity 
to acquire, within a reasonable time, the ability to do the job.19  
Section 4 further requires that when an employer determines whether or not a person is suitably 
qualified then the employer needs to review the aforementioned factors, and whether the 
individual has the ability to do the job or a combination of those factors.20  With this said an 
employer only need shortlist and interview candidates which meet the requirements of being 
suitably qualified. The reason for this is that appointing an individual to a role for which s/he is 
not suitably qualified, especially where there are applicants who are suitably qualified, may 
constitute unfair discrimination and, if the unsuccessful applicant is an existing employee, may 
also constitute an unfair labour practice. With that said in Ndlovu v CCMA21 the court found that 
where an applicant alleges that they were suitably qualified for the role and therefore should 
have been interviewed and possibly appointed to a role that, that applicant then needs to produce 
evidence substantiating such claim. The arbitrator in the preceding arbitration hearing said the 
following: 
"There is no doubt in my mind that the applicant is eminently qualified for a senior position in 
the ranks of Government.  It is also quite clear that he has rendered sterling service to his 
employer.  Is he, therefore, on the aforementioned basis entitled to a senior position?  If indeed 
he is so entitled, does he stand head and shoulders above everyone else who is so qualified?  
There is no evidence to persuade me that the answers to these two questions should be in the 
affirmative.  Considering the applicant's stated intention to obtain a severance package as far 
back as 1996, I question the wisdom of promoting him.  It appears to me that the clamour for a 
senior post is intended to justify a demand for a more generous severance package.  It appears 
to me that any employer who acts conservatively in order to avoid being saddled with an 
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exhorbitant severance package is not committing an unfair labour practice.  Such an 
employer, in my view, can legitimately claim to be inspired by a desire for proper governance.  
In sum, I am not convinced that the respondent committed an unfair labour practice in failing to 
promote the applicant.  It is nowhere evident that the applicant was entitled to the promotion 
deserved.  It is also not clear that the successful applicants was or were not more deserving than 
the applicant.  No evidence was led to show that the respondent was capricious or arbitrary in 
its decision." 
Hence based on the above submission made by the arbitrator the court found nothing wrong with 
the arbitrators reasoning and that although the applicant has proved their suitability in terms of 
qualifications and skills that only constitutes one aspect and another aspect that needs to be 
discharged is that the decision to appoint someone else to the post in preference to the applicant 
was unfair. This would require comparing the qualities of the two candidates, and the decision by 
the employer to appoint one instead of the other needs to be rational and if it is then there can be 
no question of unfairness. The court dismissed the application with costs. Therefore where an 
applicant seeks to prove an unfair labour practice as it relates to promotion it is insufficient to 
show that they were sufficiently qualified. The employee must also show that the employer’s 
decision to appoint someone else was irrational and therefore unfair.  
 
 2.1.3 Do shortlisted candidates have to be treated the same? 
 
Procedural fairness is concerned with equal treatment and avoiding privileging some applicants 
over others. All shortlisted candidates have therefore to be treated the same in the administration 
of the recruitment policy and procedure. What this means is that if the procedure requires that all 
applicants are interviewed and then undergo a psychometric evaluation, then this is the process 
that needs to be followed with all shortlisted applicants. A failure to do so will result in unfair 
discrimination and can constitute an unfair labour practice. The case of SAPS v Safety and 
Security Bargaining Council & others22 laid down clear principles when determining unfair 
conduct relating to promotions. Firstly there is no right to promotion in the ordinary course, only 
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a right to be given a fair opportunity to compete for a post. The exceptions are when there is a 
contractual or statutory right to promotion. Secondly any conduct that denies an employee a fair  
opportunity to compete for a post constitutes an unfair labour practice. Thirdly if the employee is 
not denied the opportunity to compete for a post, the only justification for scrutinizing the 
selection process is to determine whether the appointment was arbitrary or motivated by an 
unacceptable reason. Fourth, the consequence of this principle is that as long as the decision can 
be rationally justified, mistakes in process of evaluation do not constitute unfairness, justifying 
and interference with the decision to appoint. Lastly, as there is no right to promotion, the 
appropriate remedy, as a general rule, is to set aside the decision and refer it back so that a fair 
opportunity is given. The appropriate remedy would therefore be the fair opportunity to compete 
as this is where the interest lies, as opposed to compensation or appointing another applicant to 
the post. There are however two exceptions: this principle does not apply to discrimination or 
victimization cases in respect of which different and compelling constitutional interests are at 
stake. It also does not apply if the applicant proves that but for the unfair conduct, they would 
have been appointed.23 The case therefore indicates and lays down clear case law supporting that 
all shortlisted candidates must be treated the same, as all shortlisted candidates need to be given 
a fair opportunity to compete. 
 
 
 2.1.4 Does an employer have to engage in targeted selection? 
 
Targeted selection is an interviewing method used to evaluate candidates’ competencies which is 
based on their past behavior and as a measure to gauge whether they are the right individual for 
the job. The employer needs to ensure however that each candidate interviewed is asked the 
same questions as this allows for an equal comparison of the quality of answers. This 
interviewing technique is one which is favoured by many employers who prefer the concept that 
past performance predicts future performance.24  
Boyatzis in his book The Competent Manager25 submits that there are certain characteristics or 
abilities that enable an individual to demonstrate appropriate specific actions which lead to 
specific results, these are results required by the organization in order for it to function 
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effectively. He submits that these characteristics or abilities can be called competencies and that 
these competencies represent the capability that, that individual brings to the job situation.26 
Competencies may be a motive, trait, and aspect of the person’s self-image or social role, skill, 
or a body of knowledge which he or she uses. However organizations are not limited to the 
aforementioned as the only competencies. There are many other common competencies which 
organizations use, for instance; communication, teamwork, leadership, focus, adaptability and 
problem solving, amongst others. Organizations then often build competency profiles prior to the 
commencement of the recruitment process as these profiles often determine how the 
advertisement will be set out. These profiles are normally derived from the current demands of 
the job. The National Qualifications Framework (NQF)  which was established in terms of the 
South African Qualifications Authority Act 58 of 1995, utilizes the concept of competency into 
an eight level framework which recognizes and categorizes competence at all levels of an 
organization. Competency based assessment is integral to selection training and promotion. The 
focus is more on outcomes than pre-requisite levels of education which have acted as barriers to 
entry to a position. Education levels and education must be shown to have a direct link to an 
individual’s ability to do the job.  
If targeted selection is not used is it fair? It is submitted that targeted selection aims to be an 
objective methodology, providing a record of scoring, so that the fairness of the decision can be 
later justified, if necessary. However it can be that other methodologies can be used that treat all 




 2.1.5 Can an employer deviate from the job advertisement? 
A situation can arise where an applicant does not meet a minimum requirement for a post but 
remains interesting to the employer. Can such a person be short-listed alongside applicants who 
do meet the minimum requirements? In Sedibeng District Municipality v South African Local 
Governing Bargaining Council and Others27 it is made clear that an employer does not need to 
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specify every aspect of the recruitment process in the advertisement and that every consideration 
taken into account in the appointment of a candidate need not appear in the advertisement. The 
judgment states: 
…I agree, that not every consideration that is taken into account needs to appear in the 
advertisement, though it is certainly preferable to mention upfront a factor that might 
completely disqualify a candidate. However, I am inclined to agree that the arbitrator did 
misdirect himself in emphasising the importance of the criterion not being advertised, whereas 
the real issue in dispute between the parties was whether, or alternatively to what extent, the 
municipality could have regard to the outcomes of the polygraph tests in deciding on the 
appointments….28 
In South African Post Office Ltd v Commission for Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration and 
Others29 the applicant knew that a valid driver’s licence was a pre-requisite for applying for the 
advertised post as the advertisement clearly stated that one of the requirements for the role was 
a valid driver’s licence. Despite this the applicant third respondent submitted a CV which stated 
that she was in possession of a valid driver’s licence, only for the applicant to later, after 
appointing the third respondent, find out that the third respondent did not have one. The third 
respondent was then subsequently dismissed.  The Labour Appeal Court found that the 
commissioner had not properly applied his mind to the facts submitted, as the commissioner 
found that although the applicant had committed an act of misconduct, it was not so severe 
because the applicant made a mistake by not checking her CV before she sent it, as the CV was 
supposed to reflect learners licence and not drivers licence. The applicant credited this mistake 
on her CV to the fact that another individual had typed up her CV.  The commissioner therefore 
set aside the dismissal. The court found that if the commissioner’s award were to stand it would 
“make nonsense of an employer’s right to set minimum and functional standards for each 
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position it wants to fill.”30 The court found that dismissal was fair. The two cases point clearly 
to the fact that where a requirement advertised is inherent to the operation of the job then the 
employer is by no means allowed deviation from the advertisement. However had an employer 
not mentioned a particular requirement as inherent in the advertisement, to then subsequently 
add an additional requirement post the advertising phase would be unfair and the employer 
should then start the process all over and re-advertise the job.  
The fundamental reason why an employer should not ignore a minimum requirement is that 
there could be others who would have applied for the post had they known that a stated 
minimum requirement was in fact flexible. The procedurally fair response is for the employer to 
withdraw the advertisement and to re-advertise the post with that minimum requirement 
withdrawn or stated as simply a desirable attribute.  
 2.1.6 Is it possible to prevent pre-decisions? 
 
As has been noted above, procedural fairness requires all applicants to be given an equal 
opportunity to compete for the post. This requirement is eroded if a decision has already been 
made ahead of the interview process. In the private sector there may be little other applicants can 
do if there was no racial or gender discrimination involved. The public sector is different and 
administrative fairness prohibits the prejudging the decision.  
 
One way in which pre-selection can be avoided is by ensuring that the same procedure is 
followed correctly each and every time. With that said if the pre-selected individual is an 
individual who is in line with the affirmative action goals of an organization then as long as that 
person is suitably qualified, even though they were not the strongest candidate, they could still be 
the successful and justifiable candidate. But this would need to be guided throughout the 
recruitment process and the company should make a targeted statement in its advertisement. 
However targeted statements may only be used in reference to designated groups. The company 
will then further need to prove the numerical goal set to recruit individuals from that specific 
category of designated groups. If the company cannot do this and cannot prove that the reason 
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for earmarking a candidate for a particular job was not due to favoritism then it definitely sets the 
grounds for an unfair discrimination or unfair labour practice suit.  
 
The original practice of targeted selection required that scoring of each candidate should be done 
in silence to avoid a dominant or senior person on the selection committee swaying the scoring 
by remarks made immediately after that interview. Only when all members of the selection 
committee have completed their assessment should the scores be revealed. If there is a 
divergence in scoring then it allows individual members of the committee to justify their scoring, 
persuading others of the merits of the candidate. In this way a consensus decision can be reached 
without a pre-decided candidate automatically being scored highest.  
 
If the committee is unethical in its practices, nothing will really prevent pre-discussions and 




2.2 Does the LRA require procedural fairness in recruitment? 
 
2.2.1  
The LRA under section 186 (2) deals with unfair labour practices, and specifies unfair conduct 
by the employer relating to promotions, amongst others; however it does not deal with applicants 
for appointment. The unfair labour practice provisions regulate conduct between the employer 
and existing employees. The LRA focuses on an employer’s conduct in the promotions process 
to determine whether it is deemed fair or unfair conduct. This means that although employees’ 
are not entitled to promotion, an employer’s conduct during the promotion process may be 
brought into question. The fairness of the employer’s conduct will be measured in terms of its 
own procedural policies and practices. However the courts are reluctant to get involved in the 
substantive reasons for an appointment, as the appointment is often based on the performance of 
the employee during the interview.  In order to ensure procedural fairness the employer actually 
needs to follow its own internal procedures. Just because an employee is acting in a position it 
does not mean that the employee will automatically be appointed to that position. The employee 
26 
 




2.2.2 What do the cases say about procedural requirements?  
In Mlambo and Others v National Prosecuting Authority and Others31 the court upheld an 
arbitration award that the non-promotion of the applicants was in fact not an unfair labour 
practice. The court’s reason for coming to this conclusion was because the applicants did not 
meet a minimum requirement for the role, that minimum requirement being the possession of a 
driver’s license. What this case substantiates is that it will not be unfair to refuse promotion to 
employees who lack a requirement for the job.  
In Ndlovu v CCMA and Others32 the applicant referred a dispute at the CCMA regarding his non-
promotion, under the banner of an unfair labour practise. The arbitrator in the matter found that 
he was indeed qualified and that he had a record of impeccable service. However there was no 
evidence submitted to the arbitrator whether the other applicants to the position were more or 
less qualified for the role and why the applicant was the most suitably qualified and should 
therefore have received the role. The arbitrator therefore found that no evidence was lead to 
show that the employer was arbitrary in its decision not to appoint the applicant. This matter was 
then brought under review to the labour court and the judge found that there was a rational 
objective connecting the evidential material submitted to the arbitrator connecting the decision to 
which the arbitrator arrived and he therefore would not interfere with the arbitration award. The 
application was therefore dismissed with costs. This case suggests that if an employee intends 
bringing an unfair labour practise claim relating to promotion, that employee also needs to 
submit evidence in support of the claim that the employer was unfair in promoting someone else 
above that individual. But this is in practice a difficult onus to discharge. Where will an applicant 
get evidence that they did indeed far surpass the other applicants? Usually this information is 
solely in the hands of the employer. If targeted selection was used, the unsuccessful applicant 
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could make application for the scoring sheets to be subpoenaed. But short of this, it is invariably 
very difficult to prove an unfair promotion. 
  
2.2.3 What is the effect of employer error? 
 
In Bosman v SA Police Services33, Bosman was selected by a selection committee as the second 
best candidate for the job and a black woman had been selected as the first choice. The SAPS 
Provincial Commissioner however found that Bosman was the first choice; despite this the 
committee still decided to appoint the black female applicant because of representativeness of 
the population group. Subsequently at the arbitration the committee was unable to provide proof 
that the appointment of a black woman would have promoted representativeness and that the 
black woman was the best candidate. There was no proof that her appointment would have been 
an affirmative action appointment. The commissioner found that the appointment of the black 
woman was unfair and ordered the employer to promote Bosman as he proved to be the best 
candidate and therefore had the right to be promoted. This case serves to reiterate that a failure 
by the employer to prove it had been following its own procedures in the promotion of an 
employee will and could result in their decision being overturned and the employer’s prerogative 
in the decision being overridden.  
 
2.3 Does the EEA require procedural fairness in recruitment? 
 
 2.3.1 The definition of ‘employee’ includes applicants for jobs 
 
 Unlike the definition of employee in the LRA, the EEA includes an applicant for employment in 
its definition of employee in terms of Section 6, 7 & 8. This means that applicants for 
employment are protected from being unfairly discriminated against whether directly or 
indirectly, unless the discrimination is in order to take affirmative action measures or based on an 
inherent requirement of the job.34 It also protects an applicant for employment against medical 
testing unless it is permitted by legislation and justifiable. The EEA also protects applicants for 
employment against psychometric testing, unless such test has been scientifically shown to be 
valuable and reliable. This means that employers need to be sure to follow legislative 
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requirements when making appointments as well as ensuring fairness. It will however be more 
difficult for an applicant for employment to prove as they have less access to information 
pertaining to appointments and may very often not know who the other applicants were.  
 
 2.3.2 EEA’s concern: discrimination rather than procedure 
 
When the Employment Equity Act is considered, sections 6, 7 & 8 specifically deal with 
procedural fairness in the recruitment process. However the Act is more concerned with 
discrimination than it is with procedure. The reason for this submission is because the act is 
primarily concerned with equity in the workplace and securing that right to equity for all 
employees. The focus of the EEA is to see that if discrimination has taken place and if so 
whether such discrimination was unfair. Discrimination in terms of the EEA will be considered 
fair if it promotes affirmative action measures in the workplace and if it is for an inherent 
requirement of the job. This concern with discrimination as opposed to procedure can be seen in 
National Education Health & Allied Workers Union & another v Office of the Premier: Province 
of the Eastern Cape.35 The judge in this case makes mention of the discrimination as opposed to 
procedural focus of the EEA when he makes the following finding:  
Turning back to the issue of procedural complaint by the applicant, I agree with Mr Wade for 
the respondent that the core of the case so far made by the testimony of Mr Khelekheta has to 
do more than anything else with the complaint about the procedural aspect of how the 
recruitment of the third respondent was effected. That does indeed pose a challenge to the case 
of the Applicant as this court jurisdiction is limited to adjudicating over discrimination claims 
in terms of the provisions of the EEA. I also agree that no case has been made in terms of the 
allegation of discrimination.  
There is thus flexibility in the procedure as long as that flexibility is enforced, so as to meet an 
equity goal. The unsuccessful applicant in this case felt that the appointment of the successful 
candidate constituted unfair discrimination against the applicant. However the employer in this 
case had proved with expert evidence that the appointment of the successful candidate was in 
fulfilment of the employment equity targets which the employer had set for itself.  
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2.4 Remedies for procedural unfairness 
 
As has been noted above, in the case of SAPS v Safety and Security Bargaining Council & 
others36, the appropriate remedy, as a general rule, is to set aside the decision and refer it back so 
that a fair opportunity is given. The appropriate remedy would therefore be the fair opportunity 
to compete as this is where the interest lies, as opposed to compensation or appointing another 
applicant to the post. But there are a range of possibilities which the court could order. 
 
 2.4.1 Substitution of successful applicant 
 
In Coetzer & others v Minister of Safety and Security & another37 the applicants all worked in 
the bomb squad division of SAPS and had applied for promotions. The applicants were all white 
males and were subsequently turned down because the posts were only for designated groups. 
However although SAPS had an Employment Equity Plan, the plan required that each division of 
the SAPS had to create its own Employment Equity Plan, but the bomb squad division of the 
SAPS did not. The National Commissioner refused to promote them despite the fact that no other 
applications had been received from members for designated groups for the positions to which 
the applicants had applied. The applicants therefore approached the Labour Court for relief and 
laid a claim that they were unfairly discriminated against on a racial basis. The court looked at 
the Employment Equity Plan put together by the SAPS along with the Constitution. What the 
court found was that Section 205-208 of the Constitution deals with the police force, stating that 
there must be a balance between affirmative action plans and other objectives. One of these is 
that there must be an effective police force. The court also found that if an employer relies on 
affirmative action that it must show that it does not conflict with the Constitution. As the bomb 
squad did not have its own affirmative action plan, the SAPS therefore could not use this as a 
defence. The applicants subsequently were successful and the court overturned the employer’s 
decision and promoted the applicants. This case illustrates that when relying on affirmative 
action requirements as a reason for not appointing or promoting an individual that the employer 
needs to ensure that it does not conflict with other sections of the Constitution.  Also where only 
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representivity is taken into account at the cost of operational efficiency, then that decision may 
be considered unfair.   
 
 
 2.4.2 Requiring the process to begin again 
In Khumalo & another v MEC for Education, KwaZulu-Natal38 applicant, Mr Khumalo, applied 
for a position as Chief Personnel Officer. After undergoing the interviewing and selection 
process Mr Khumalo was then appointed. Another candidate who had applied, Mr Ritchie, had 
been declined. After lodging a grievance and the grievance failing, Mr Ritchie then referred a 
dispute to the General Public Servants Sectoral Bargaining Council and contended that he should 
have been shortlisted and appointed because he met the requirements for the post. The matter 
between Ritchie and the department was then referred to arbitration as conciliation had failed. 
The MEC then contended that due to the documentation regarding Mr Khumalo’s interview and 
appointment going missing the department could therefore not formulate a defence and as such 
offered to settle the dispute by granting Ritchie a protected promotion, which meant that he 
received a salary increase but his title and promotion remained the same, which Ritchie accepted. 
After being approached by the union regarding various grievances and inconsistencies relating to 
Mr Khumalo’s appointment and Mr Ritchie’s protected promotion, the MEC approached the 
Labour Court to adjudicate the matter. The court granted an order declaring that Khumalo’s 
promotion to Chief Personnel Officer and the protected promotion of Ritchie “was not lawful, 
reasonable or fair and was accordingly invalid.” Mr Khumalo’s appointment and Mr Ritchie’s 
protected promotion was then set aside and the MEC was ordered to re-advertise the role.  
The case was then taken to the Labour appeal Court as the employees felt that the court a quo 
had erred in its findings and subsequent order. The Labour Appeal Court agreed with the Labour 
Court, in that based on the facts submitted it was correct in setting aside Khumalo and Ritchie’s 
appointments. What this case illustrates is that if and when the integrity of an appointment or 
promotion has been compromised, the setting aside of that appointment even after many years is 
an appropriate remedy for the bias caused by the irregular appointment.  
                                               





 2.4.3 Compensation  
 
In Kwadukuza Municipality v South African Local Government Bargaining Council and Others39 
the third respondent and employee of the applicant sought to apply for a promotion. However the 
municipality had not advertised the position and had promoted individuals into the vacant posts 
without following its own recruitment procedure, of which advertising the positions were part of 
that procedure. The third respondent successfully challenged and won an arbitration award 
claiming an unfair labour practice regarding the employer’s conduct in this matter and the fact 
that he was not given a fair opportunity to apply. The arbitrator in the matter then awarded the 
third respondent with a ‘protected promotion’ which meant that the third respondent would still 
perform in his current capacity and receive compensation and benefits equal to that of the 
promoted role. Although on review the Labour Court agreed with the arbitrator that the third 
respondent’s case should succeed, the court felt that the arbitrator had erred in its application of 
the correct compensation in a matter of this nature. The court relied upon an earlier judgment in 
Fose v Minister of Safety and Security40 which ruled that no punitive element should be imposed 
in an award in light of public policy and constitutional considerations which underlie imposing 
such award, and therefore found that no punitive award should be made. Instead the court 
awarded lump sum compensation which took the form of general damages as appropriate to 
compensate for injuria, to the value of R5,000. This case indicates that a protected promotion 
would only be suitable relief where the employee can prove that he/she would have been the 
successful candidate for promotion.  
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Chapter 3:  Substantive fairness in recruitment 
 
3.1 What does substantive fairness entail? 
 
Employers for many years have been able to use their managerial prerogative to appoint who it 
wanted regardless of whether he/she was the best person for the job. This unfairness also served 
to empower injustices in society and would often perpetuate a cycle of poverty. However in the 
mid 1980’s the concept of unfair labour practice was introduced and for the first time employers 
were required to justify their decisions on rational and objective grounds free from 
discrimination 
 
In Mlambo and Others v National Prosecution Authority and Others41the court found that the 
applicants had failed to establish that an arbitrator’s finding was unreasonable which concluded 
that the non-promotion of the applicants was fair. The reason for this was because it was a 
precondition for the jobs to which they had applied that they had drivers licenses’; they 
unfortunately did not have drivers licenses. The applicants conceded that the court should not 
readily get involved in disputes relating to promotions unless the applicants could prove bad faith 
or improper motive. This is not the case as the employer’s reason, based on the applicants failing 
to meet a minimum requirement as set out in the advertisement, was both reasonable and fair. 
What this indicates is that it is not unfair to refuse promotion when an applicant fails to meet a 
minimum requirement needed in order to perform the role, and reliance on minimum 
requirements and screening criteria in the recruitment process is indeed substantively fair.  
In McPherson v UKZN & another42 the applicant had been working at the respondent university 
on a 5 year contract and had applied for a role advertised to “any permanent member of staff” at 
the level of senior lecturer. The post he had applied for was head of the School of Physics which 
was effectively his old post renamed in the new merged structure. He was however not 
considered for the role. He then referred a dispute to the CCMA but it was not resolved in 
conciliation. The employer argued that its exclusion of temporary/contract staff did not amount 
to unfair discrimination under section 6(1) and (2) of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998. It 
argued that its Employment Equity Policy needed to be measured against the operational 
requirements of the university. The court found that employer had a substantial number of 
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temporary staff in its employ. It therefore found that the eligibility requirement was 
discriminatory to the members of staff who had been employed on a temporary basis. 
Justification for discrimination in law focuses on the purpose and reason for the discrimination. 
The judge in the case said this: 
“As I consider the reasons preferred for inherent operational requirements of the [employer], I 
find none that I can regard as permanent attributes or quality, forming an essential element of 
such requirements. The reasons given, in my view, come across as requirements based on the 
preferences of the first respondents senior employees.” 
The judge therefore ordered compensation to the applicant to the value of 6 months 
remuneration, as he had already found alternative employment elsewhere. This case illustrates 
that where an employer is going to reserve a recruitment process to internal permanent 
employees then it also needs to be able to provide legitimate operational reasons for doing so.  
 
 
3.2 Substantive fairness under the LRA 
 
 3.2.1 Does the highest scoring employee have to be appointed? 
 
In Van Dyk v Kouga Municipality43Mr Van Dyk the applicant laid a claim of unfair 
discrimination on the grounds of his race or sex when he was not appointed to the position of 
platoon officer in the fire department of the respondent. The applicant applied for the position in 
2009 of Platoon Officer in the fire department of Kouga Municipality, a position which the 
applicant had held for 6 years between 1997 and 2003. The applicant however resigned in 2003, 
therefore when applying for this position of platoon officer in 2009, he was then an external 
applicant. The applicant was shortlisted along with another two candidates, one of which was a 
coloured female, Ms A Rossouw, who was employed at the time as a senior fireman. However 
one of the requirements advertised on the advertisement was a graduate certificate issued by the 
South African Fire Services Institute. Of all applicants shortlisted only the applicant had the 
qualification when the interviews took place. After the interviews Rossouw was the highest 
scoring applicant and therefore was appointed to role. The reason the panel gave as to why she 
was selected despite the fact that she never had the graduate certificate as specified in the 
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advertisement was because the panel had relied on section 20 (3) of the Employment Equity Act 
which states the following: 
“20(3) For purposes of this Act, a person may be suitably qualified for a job as a result of any 
one of, or any combination of that person's- 
(a) formal qualifications; 
(b) prior learning; 
(c) relevant experience; or 
(d) capacity to acquire, within a reasonable time, the ability to do the job.” 
The respondent therefore explained that its reason for shortlisting Rossouw was because they 
believed that even though she did not hold the graduate certificate required by the post she had 
the capacity to acquire the ability to do the job within reasonable time. The court found in favour 
of the respondent, and made the following statement in the judgment: 
“It is true that Rossouw would not have been appointed if she had not been short-listed. It is 
also true that, at the time of the interviews, the applicant was the best qualified candidate. 
However, Rossouw’s short-listing was done on the basis that she had the capacity to acquire 
the minimum qualification, and in the interviews even Barnard clearly did not regard her as 
unsuitable. The reason for her short-listing in terms of the criteria under section 20 (3)(b),(c) 
and (d) of the EEA was legitimate, in the absence of any legal pre-requisite that she had to have 
the graduation certificate to perform the platoon officer’s job.”44 
What this illustrates is that failure to appoint the most qualified candidate will not be considered 
unfair where shortlisting is done on the basis that the individual appointed is from a designated 
group and has the capacity to obtain within a reasonable time, the minimum qualification.  
 
 
 3.2.2 What is the extent of managerial prerogative? 
 
In Ethekweni Metropolitan Municipality: Durban Metropolitan Police Services v Khanya and 
Others45  the respondents had applied for a post of sergeant with the applicant. The post was 
initially advertised as Circular 183 and was later amended and re-advertised as circular 189 now 
with an additional minimum requirement of a code 15 motorcycle licence. The applicants then 
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lodged an unfair labour practice dispute with the South African Local Government Bargaining 
Council for conciliation relating to “non-shortlisting”. The matter was not resolved and then 
referred to the CCMA for arbitration. One of the respondents said that he was not shortlisted due 
to his disability and therefore could not obtain a code 15 motorcycle license. His main contention 
was that it was “unfair and discriminatory”, and due to the fact that he was bringing a claim of 
unfair discrimination as regulated by the Employment Equity Act, the CCMA did not have 
jurisdiction. Nevertheless the arbitration award dealt with his claim. The Labour Court then 
found that the arbitration award was reviewable for not finding in favour of the respondent, Mr 
Khanya, was also awarded compensation. The applicant then appealed to the Labour Appeal 
Court who found that the Labour Court’s review of the arbitration award was erroneous as the 
CCMA did not have jurisdiction over discrimination claims.  The court made the following 
statement: 
The Court a quo correctly found that it remains the employer’s prerogative to set the standard 
for its employees (although in this case the employers hand was forced by its employees who 
won an arbitration award requiring the employer to force the requirement of a code 15 
motorcycle licence for the position of Sergeant). The setting of the requirement of code 15 
licence for the position of Sergeant does also not conflict with the provisions of either the 
Constitution or the LRA. Certainly to require code 15 licence for the post of Sergeant as an 
essential requirement is and cannot amount to unfair labour practice as contended by the 
aggrieved employees.46 
This case held that it is an employer’s prerogative to set minimum standards for jobs for the 
operation of its business. However in setting these minimum requirements it may not conflict 
with the provisions of the Constitution or the Labour Relations Act.  
However this judgment is out of line with the previous decisions which dealt with inherent 
requirements of the job. In Dlamini & others v Green Four Security47the court accepted that the 
company’s ‘clean shaven rule’ was a justified inherent requirement for a job that required 
uniformity and discipline. However it would be difficult to argue that a security guards job could 
not be competently carried out unless clean shaven. The sentiment was not carried out in the 
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Department of Correctional Services & another v POPCRU48 the famous dreadlocks saga, the 
department failed to establish that its short hair policy which unnecessarily restricted religious 
and cultural practice had any impact on the performance of the employees’ duties and so could 
not be considered an inherent requirement. However despite this decision it is possible that 
wearing a corporate uniform and complying with dress code could in certain circumstances be 
regarded as an inherent requirement of the job. Branding and corporate image are justifiably 
important aspects of some employment.  
 
To be free of Diabetes was stated as an inherent requirement of the job for a firefighter. This was 
contested in IMATU & another v City of Cape Town49the court here found that the inherent 
requirement defense needed to be applied restrictively. The municipality failed to justify its 
unfair discrimination in the form of a blanket ban. The court found that although firefighting is a 
hazardous occupation to simply excluding all insulin dependent diabetes sufferers from the 
occupation on this ground was not justifiable. The court warned against assigning characteristics 
which are generalized assumptions about groups of people to each individual who is a member 
of that group, irrespective of whether the particular individual displays any susceptibility to 
hypoglycemic episodes. This illustrates that an employer may need to check the health status of a 
particular applicant or employee as opposed to diagnosing diabetes as prevention for the 
individual to perform the job.50  
 
In Arries v CCMA51the applicant, Ms Arries, lodged a claim of an unfair labour practice when 
she had not been promoted despite having applied for various senior roles over the period 
September 2000 to April 2002.52 She then lodged a grievance, the commissioner issued an award 
declaring that the employer, Beacon Island Hotel, had not committed an unfair labour practice 
and that Ms Arries was accordingly not entitled to relief. Ms Arries then appealed to the Labour 
Court and sought for that arbitration award be reviewed and set aside. The court referred to 
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Public Servants Association on behalf of Botes & Others v Department of Justice53 in which said 
it was said that when considering whether an employer had acted unfairly in failing or refusing to 
promote an employee that one must consider the reasons for the actions of the employer and only 
interfere with the employers discretion if it has acted frivolously, capriciously or unreasonably. 
The court mentioned the fact that of the many legal principles that the court had referred to in the 
matter, the aforementioned principle, amongst others, was also used by the commissioner as ones 
which he needed to assess in the matter that had been set before him. The court found that 
commissioner’s award was sustainable on both the facts submitted to the commissioner. The 
court agreed with the commissioner’s reasoning for the refusal to promote Ms Arries. The 
relevant considerations were (a) whether the employer’s decision was based on unacceptable, 
irrelevant or invidious comparisons ; or (b) that the decision was arbitrary, or capricious, or 
unfair; or (c) that the employer had failed to apply its mind to the promotion of the applicant; or 
(d) that the employer’s decision not to promote the applicant was motivated by bad faith, or (e) 
that it was discriminatory. The court found this to be a proper approach on the part of the 
commissioner. The court agreed with the commissioner’s findings that he could not find any 
grounds upon which to interfere with the employer’s exercise of discretion. The application was 
therefore dismissed. A clear indication is given in this case of the extent to which a 
commissioner would have to consider and measure the employer’s decision against various 
grounds before interfering with the employer’s exercise of discretion. Unless it has been proved 
that the employer had acted capriciously, frivolously or unreasonably then the commissioner 
should not interfere with the employer’s exercise of discretion.  
 
3.3 Substantive fairness under the EEA 
 
3.3.1 Non-discrimination on grounds of age, HIV status, pregnancy, race, gender, 
sexual orientation, culture, conscience 
 
The Employment Equity Act under section 6(1) prohibits unfair discrimination on the grounds of 
age, HIV status, pregnancy, sexual orientation, culture and conscience, amongst others. In 
dealing with the issue of what would be considered substantively fair in the aforementioned 
                                               




scenarios it is necessary to consider the leading case of Hoffman v SAA54. In the case the 
appellant, Mr Hoffman, had applied for the position of flight attendant. The appellant was 
selected as one of 12 applicants to be employed out of 173 applicants. The applicant’s selection 
was subject to a pre-employment medical examination which included an HIV test. The 
appellant was then refused appointment on the basis of his HIV status. The court found this 
decision on the part of SAA to amount to an unfair labour practice as it constituted impairment 
on the applicant’s dignity.  The court also found that the refusal to employ the applicant was an 
infringement on his Section 9 Constitutional right to equality. The court establishes that to 
exclude all HIV positive applicants from employment as cabin attendants, despite the 
information provided by current medical knowledge regarding the applicant’s ability to perform 
the job without endangering the health and safety of passengers, was manifestly unfair. This 
practice would make such candidates vulnerable to discrimination on the basis of prejudice and 
unfounded assumptions, which is precisely what the Constitution seeks to avoid. SAA had 
argued that the safety of its passengers and staff was its main concern. However this was refuted 
by the fact that it had cabin attendants currently in its employ that were HIV positive who 
therefore posed the same hazards.  For this reason the court found that SAA’s reasons for not 
appointing the applicant failed and found in favour of the applicant.  
This case illustrates that an employer needs to be able to show how an individual’s HIV status 
will have a direct influence on that individual’s ability to perform the job and how it therefore 
constitutes an inherent requirement for the individual to be HIV negative.55 Only then will the 
employer have discharged the onus of proving substantive fairness. Also in Bootes v Eagle Ink 
Systems56the court confirmed that dismissal of employees because of their HIV status is 
discrimination unless the employer can show that being free of HIV is an inherent requirement of 
the job.  
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In Woolworths v Whitehead57 the respondent, Ms Whitehead, applied for a position as an HR 
Generalist and advised the employer  that she was pregnant. Ms Whitehead, after a telephonic 
conversation with the recruiter for the position, was left with the impression that the job was 
hers. Ms Whitehead was offered a position but she was not offered the permanent position of HR 
Generalist. The position was offered to another candidate who was more suitably qualified and 
experienced for the position. Ms Whitehead was subsequently offered a fixed term position on 
account of her being pregnant.  Ms Whitehead brought a claim in the Labour Court that she had 
been dismissed by the applicant in this case after she had been appointed as the human resources: 
information technology generalist. She claimed that the dismissal had been unfair and sought 
compensation. The Labour Court dismissed her claim but granted her relief on the basis of the 
claim of an alleged unfair labour practice that the appellant had committed an unfair labour 
practice by not appointing Ms Whitehead as human resources: information and technology 
generalist but that they had instead appointed someone else. Because there was no cross appeal 
to the Labour Court’s dismissal of the dismissal claim, the Labour Appeal Court was not 
concerned with this. However, the LAC said in its reasoning said that its decision was based not 
on the fact the applicant brought forth a case that continuity would be an issue, but gave more 
weight to the fact of the case brought forward by the applicant that the successful candidate was 
substantially more sufficiently qualified. It is interesting to note the court’s decision for its ruling 
that it is not unfair discrimination when choosing a more suitably qualified candidate over a 
suitably qualified but pregnant candidate. Key to note is that where an employer has not yet 
made an offer it reserves the right and prerogative to change its mind. Also, although continuity 
was not the substantial factor tipping the scale in this decision it however did not dispute that 
continuity may be an issue.  
In Swart v Mr Video58 the applicant, Ms Swart, brought a claim of an unfair discrimination. This 
was due to Ms Swart being three years older than the age limit specified by an advertisement 
placed by the respondent, which Ms Swart had applied to.110 The respondent also submitted that 
its main two reasons for not appointing the candidate was because the salary was low and only 
younger people who use the position as stepping stone in their careers would accept the salary. 
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The second reason submitted by the respondent was that compatibility is important and that and 
older person may be reluctant to take instruction from a younger person. The respondent 
submitted this second reason as the main reason for refusing to appoint Ms Swart. The 
commissioner found that discrimination can be justified when it is based on inherent 
requirements of the job, however the commissioner could not find any in the case. The 
commissioner found that the employer committed an unfair labour practice and cited Schedule 7 
item 2(1) of the Labour Relations Act which refers to an unfair labour practice as: 
“unfair discrimination, either directly or indirectly, against an employee on any arbitrary 
ground, including but not limited to race, gender, sex, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual 
orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, political opinion, culture, language, 
marital status or family responsibility”  
And not only had the respondent discriminated against Ms Swart on the basis of age but also on 
the basis of marital status and family responsibility. This is due to the employer representative’s 
statement that he was reluctant to employ Ms Swart on account of her being married and having 
children.59 When deciding on his award in the matter the commissioner consulted the Labour 
Relations Act Schedule 7 (2) definition which includes an applicant for employment in the 
definition of employee.60 This meant that a discriminatory refusal to employ was regarded as an 
automatically unfair dismissal. The commissioner awarded Ms Swart 3 months compensation. 
Proving age as an inherent requirement of being able to do a job is vital in proving the 
substantive fairness of discrimination based on age.  
In SA Airways v Janse van Vuuren61the question was investigated whether it is an inherent 
requirement of the job of an airline pilot that s/he be under the age of 60? It was argued by the 
employer that any distinction or preference against pilots above the age of 60 was based on the 
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inherent requirement of the job of a pilot. On the evidence it was established that it was not age 
but rather fitness to fly that was an inherent requirement of the job as a pilot.62  
In Strydom v Nederduitse Gereformeede Gemeente Moreleta Park63it was argued that persons in 
leadership positions in the church such as ministers, cannot live in a homosexual relationship as 
it was an inherent requirement that a spiritual leader must support church doctrine. While this 
may be true for a minister is it an inherent requirement for a music teacher at the church? The 
court was not persuaded that the church had shown that it was part of the job description that he 
was to become a role model for Christianity. The court found that at best he was a mentor of the 
post-school students on a personal and not necessarily spiritual level. There was no evidence 
brought that the applicant wanted to influence the students or any other church member. The 
applicant in fact wanted to keep his homosexual relationship to himself as he found it to be a 
private matter. The court found that it would not have been devastating to the church to keep the 
complainant on in his teaching position.   
3.3.2 Affirmative action 
In SAPS v Solidarity obo Barnard64a new post was created in the SAPS during 2005, the post 
was superintendent of the NES, the function was to ensure optimal utilization of human logistical 
and financial resources in the NES. Barnard was interviewed for the post along with six other 
candidates (four blacks and two whites). She obtained the highest score by any candidate on the 
assessment, receiving an average rating of 86,67%. The difference between Barnard’s score and 
that of any black candidate was 17,5%. The selection panel in its recommendation stated that 
given the difference between the scores, service delivery would be adversely affected if the latter 
were to be appointed. Representivity within the NES would not be affected as Barnard was 
already a member thereof, as stated by the panel. The recommendation was stated further: “The 
panel agrees that the appointment of Captain Barnard will definitely enhance service delivery”. 
A meeting was held with the Divisional Commissioner the following day at which the panel’s 
recommendation was discussed. The Divisional Commissioner Resegatla recommended that the 
post not be filled because “appointing any of the first three preferred candidates will aggravate 
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the representivity status of the already under-represented Sub-Section: Complaints 
Investigation” and that “such appointment will not enhance service delivery to a diverse 
community”. The post was left vacant and in fact withdrawn. The reason Barnard was not 
appointed to that position was because she was white. The same position was then subsequently 
advertised to which Barnard again applied. She was again shortlisted and invited for an interview 
along with seven other candidates, four African males, one African female, one “coloured” male 
and one white male. Again the selection panel recommended her appointment. A meeting was 
again held at the divisional level to discuss the panel’s recommendations. The Commissioner 
supported Barnard’s appointment but the national commissioner did not approve of the 
recommendation and withdrew the post, because the appointment did not address representivity. 
This decision was first contested in the Labour Court in Solidarity obo Barnard v SA Police 
Services (LC case no. JS455/07 dated 24/02/2010). The Labour Court held that she had been 
unfairly discriminated against and that the provisions of the EEA and an employment equity plan 
must be applied in accordance with the principles of fairness and with due regard to the affected 
individuals constitutional right to equality and the need for operational efficiency. The court felt 
that the approach of applying numerical goals set out in an employment equity plan without 
considering all relevant factors was not appropriate and that, that approach was too rigid. Due 
consideration must be given to the particular circumstances of individuals potentially adversely 
affected. This decision was appealed to the LAC in South African Police Services v Solidarity 
obo Barnard (JA24/2010)[2012] ZALAC 31 (2 November 2012), and the LAC reversed the LC’s 
decision. The LAC held that it is misconstrued to implement restitutionary measures contained in 
the EEA and an employment equity plan, as being subject to an individual’s right to equality. 
The employer is the only party answerable regarding service delivery matters, and it is not open 
to compromise service delivery. The LAC’s decision was then appealed to the SCA in Solidarity 
obo Barnard v SAPS (165/2013)[2013] ZASCA 177 (28 November 2013). In a unanimous 
decision of 5 judges, the SCA overturned the LAC’ view and found that there had been unfair 
discrimination. It held that the mechanical application of targets falls foul of the EEA; A flexible 
and ‘situation sensitive’ approach is required. The SCA held that the fact that no appointment is 
made it does not necessarily mean that no discrimination took place.  
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Finally the Constitutional Court considered the matter in South African Police Service v 
Solidarity obo Barnard [2014] ZACC 23. The majority judgment supported by 7 judges started 
with the constitutional requirements for an affirmative action measure: The measure must –  
a. Target a particular class of people who have been susceptible to unfair discrimination; 
b. Be designed to protect or advance those classes of persons; and 
c. Promote the achievement of equality. 
The CC concluded that once the measure in question passes the above test, it is not unfair and 
may be implemented. The constitution is explicit that affirmative action measures are not unfair. 
It does not however derogate form the court’s power to interrogate whether the measure is 
implemented lawfully. The manner in which a properly adopted restitution measure is 
implemented can be challenged – there is no valid reason why courts are precluded from 
deciding whether a valid Employment Equity Plan has been put into practice lawfully. It needs to 
be rationally related to the terms and objects of the measure. It must be applied to advance its 
legitimate purpose and nothing else. The CC found that the SAPS affirmative action policy 
complied with these requirements. Further the National Commissioner exercised his discretion 
not to appoint Ms Barnard rationally and reasonably and in accordance with the criteria in the 
affirmative action measure, in pursuit of employment equity targets envisaged in section 6(2) of 
the Act. In para 32 the Constitutional Court acknowledged that this is difficult and emotional 
terrain and impacts on dignity rights, para 32 states:  
Remedial measures must be implemented in a way that advances the position of people who 
have suffered past discrimination. Equally, they must not unduly invade the human dignity of 
those affected by them, if we are truly to achieve a non-racial, non-sexist and socially inclusive 
society. 
The judgment took the line that affirmative action, if founded in a policy that complies with the 
Constitution and is applied lawfully and rationally, is not unfair. In terms of managerial 
prerogative, this means that once the AA policy complies with the Constitution, there is greater 




Chapter 4:  Risk management measures 
There are many factors that could pose a risk in the recruitment process. How the employer has 
overcome this is by doing various tests and checks. However jurisprudence has been developed 
over the years which govern the manner in which these risk management measures are 
administered so that it does not infringed on the candidates rights. The following chapter will 
explore these degree to which these measures have been curtailed and the manner in which they 
can legally be administered.  
4.1 Medical testing 
 4.1.1  What the EEA allows 
Section 7 of the Employment Equity Act has states the following regarding medical testing: 
(a) Medical testing of an employee is permissible only when legislation requires testing or 
when this is justifiable for various reasons. 
(b) HIV testing is prohibited unless such testing is determined to be justifiable by the Labour 
Court 
In Joy Mining Machinery v National Union of Metalworkers of SA & others65 the applicant 
sought to test its staff for HIV. The applicant employed approximately 800 employees. The 
reason for this was so that the applicant could determine the incidence of the disease amongst its 
staff so as to be better able to deal with the pandemic. It proposed for the testing to be voluntary, 
anonymous and that the ELISA saliva test is used. The applicant then applied to the Labour 
Court for an order granting it permission to carry out a HIV test in terms of section 7(2) of the 
Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998. The court in reaching its decision considered the 
justifiability of testing. This was tested against various norms and values, such as the standard of 
reasonableness and legality. It found that justifiability under the Employment Equity Act would 
be informed by the Code of Good Practice: Key Aspects of HIV/AIDS and Employment 
published December 2000. The court also considered the more general test for medical testing 
set out in Section 7(1)(b) of the Employment Equity Act. The court also considered how the 
following would have an impact on the factual circumstances of the case: the prohibition on 
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unfair discrimination, the need for HIV testing, the purpose of the test, the medical facts, 
employment conditions, social policy, the fair distribution of employee benefits, the inherent 
requirements of the job, and the category or categories of jobs or employees concerned. In 
arriving at a proper decision regarding the court also wanted to be informed of: the attitude of the 
employees, whether the test is intended to be voluntary/compulsory, the financing of the test, 
preparations for the test, i.e. whether the employees are able to give their informed consent, 
pretest counselling, the nature of the proposed test and procedure, and post-test counselling. In 
formulating the order the court paid attention to: the declaration permitting testing, imposing 
conditions relating to (a) the provision of counselling, (b) the maintenance of confidentiality; (c) 
the period which the authorization for any testing applies; and (d) the category or categories of 
jobs or employees in respect of which authorization for testing applies. It also paid attention to 
measures preventing the possibility of unfair discrimination, pre-test briefing to ensure informed 
consent, pre-test counselling, the nature of the proposed test and details of the procedure for 
conducting it, post-test counselling, proof of consent by minors and persons suffering from a 
legal disability and service of the order so that the employees concerned and their trade union or 
representatives will be fully apprised of their rights. The Labour Court granted the order sought. 
It is clear that the onus will be on the employer to take every length to ensure anonymity and 
support to its staff if it is seeking to implement HIV testing at the workplace. 
In Irvin & Johnson Ltd v Trawler & Line Fishing Union & others66the applicant who employed 
approximately 1100 employees in its trawling division sought an order declaring that the 
arranging of voluntary and anonymous HIV testing of these employees did not fall within the 
ambit of section 7(2) of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998. Alternatively the applicant 
sought an order that the testing is justifiable as contemplated in section 7(2), subject to certain 
conditions set out in the notice of motion. The applicant sought to provide pre and post-test 
counselling to the employees. The tests the applicant sought to use are the Elisa and the Abbott 
tests, the Abbott test is a rapid test using a small blood sample obtained via a pinprick, the Elisa 
test involves drawing samples of blood for testing in a pathology laboratory. The tests would be 
conducted voluntarily and with consent of the individual employees. The employees would also 
be required to sign consent forms prior to testing which will be held by the independent 
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professional testing agency Isibindi. The tests would be anonymous and results will be fed to the 
applicant by the percentage and number of employees in the various age and job categories who 
test positive. The applicant advised that no employee will be discriminated against based on their 
HIV status and that no prejudicial inference will be drawn from the refusal of an employee to 
submit to testing. the court analysed the provisions of the Employment Equity Act and found that 
when section 7(2) prohibits the testing of an employee top determine that employees HIV status, 
what it is prohibiting is a test which is designed to enable, or which will have the effect of 
enabling the employer to ascertain the HIV status of an employee. The court advised that for the 
testing which the applicant seeks a declaratory order that such testing does not fall within the 
ambit of section 7(2), then there are two grounds under which such an order can be notionally 
supported. Firstly the proposed testing would need to be anonymous and secondly it would need 
to voluntary. The court submitted a concern regarding the pulling of results for the age group 16-
25 as the age group numbers were very small. The applicant advised that they were willing to 
combine the age group to include up to age 35 or alternatively combine shore based and seagoing 
for the age group 16-25 to maintain anonymity. To court found this to eliminate any reasonable 
possibility that an individual’s HIV status could be deduced from the statistical information. The 
court found that Section 7 as a whole did not apply to voluntary testing only compulsory testing. 
The court submitted that an individual employee should be entitled to waive their protection 
according to section 7 of the act. However this does not mean that an employee waives their right 
to protection against unfair discrimination as contemplated by section 6 of the act. The court 
concluded that the voluntary and anonymous testing which the applicant wished to arrange for its 
employees did not fall within section 7(2) and the applicant therefore did not require the 
authority of the court before allowing its employees to be tested. The court granted the order 
declaring that the anonymous and voluntary testing did not fall within the ambit of section 7(2) 
of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998.  
In PFG Building Glass (Pty) Ltd v Chemical Engineering Pulp Paper Wood & Allied Workers 
Union & others67the applicant applied to the Labour Court for a declarator stating that the 
voluntary and anonymous testing of its employees for HIV did not fall within the ambit of 
section 7(2) of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998. The court placed the Employment Equity 
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Act in SA constitutional setting. It considered which rights would be affected, the nature of those 
rights, counteracting rights and the limitation on those rights. The court also noted that the 
fundamental right to control one’s body was also limited by other counteracting rights. The court 
advised that when limiting the rights of employees to control their bodies that employers need to 
ensure that other counteracting rights are not limited, such as the right to dignity, privacy, fair 
labour practices, to choose a trade, occupation or profession or to access the courts, that those 
rights are not violated. The court found that the limitation under discussion was the obligation of 
employees to submit to testing for HIV by order of the Labour Court. And because the main aim 
of the Employment Equity Act is to achieve equity in the workplace the testing may not be 
discriminatory in any way. With this said another purpose of the Employment Equity Act is to 
prevent unfair discrimination in the workplace and this is in tune with the constitutional right to 
equality. The starting point established for determining the justifiability of in terms of section 
7(2) is the same as testing the limitation on any fundamental right, i.e. it must be constitutional. 
Hence meeting the requirements of section 36 of the constitution and be balanced against section 
12(2)(b) and (c) rights and all other rights, thus giving effect to the values of an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. The Labour Court may assess 
the quality and content of the tests, and whether the method of testing is capable of achieving the 
objectives with minimum infringement on fundamental rights. The purpose for limiting the 
section 12 rights and the importance thereof depends on the reason for testing. The purpose 
motivating the reason for testing or the effect of such testing cannot be unfairly discriminatory. 
Also the court found that if the purpose of the testing is an end in itself and unrelated to the 
management of the business, it will not be justifiable as it would be, amongst others, an invasion 
of privacy. The court noted that it is a constitutional requirement for testing that the consent to 
testing be informed and that it be voluntary. The court found it unnecessary to apply a purposive 
interpretation to section 7(2), because there is stronger support of the view that voluntary HIV 
testing does not fall within the ambit of section 7(2) is founded in the Constitution. It also found 
that section 7(2) is not a limitation on the right of employees to exercise control over their bodies 
in terms of section 12(2)(b) of the Constitution and to be subject to experiment in terms of 
section 12(2)(c), if employees voluntarily give informed consent to HIV testing, even if such 
testing is at the instance of the employer. Accordingly if an employee consents to HIV testing it 
is not open to the Labour Court to interfere with such employee’s exercise of control over their 
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bodies. It therefore becomes apparent that if employees consent to be tested for HIV there is no 
need for an application to the Labour Court to determine the justifiability thereof. However 
adversely if employees refuse to consent to testing or consent without being fully informed then 
such testing will be automatically prohibited by section 7(2) read with section 12(2)(c) of the 
Constitution. Then it will be a matter for the Labour Court. The court found that the only 
material fact in the matter at hand is that employees gave their informed consent to being tested 
for HIV and that once there was consent there is no limitation of the right. The court also held 
the view that even if the testing was anonymous but was not done by the informed consent of the 
employees then it would be a contravention of section 12(2)(c) of the Constitution. The court 
accordingly granted an order that the anonymous and voluntary testing of employees for HIV did 
not fall within the ambit of section 7(2) of the Employment Equity Act.  
What is obvious from the above cases is that the approach to HIV testing of employees has 
become very relaxed in recent years. The only requirement as can be seen in all cases presented 
is that the testing needs to consensual and anonymous in order to meet the Constitutional and 
Employment Equity requirements.  
 
4.2 Psychometric testing 
 4.2.1 What the EEA allows 
The Employment Equity Act has been amended, the section 8 in the Act prior to 2013 has been 
amended by section 4 of the new Act 47 of 2013 and subsection (d) has been added. Subsection 
(d) reads as:  
“(d)has been certified by the Health Professions Council of South Africa established by section 
2 of the Health Professions Act, 1974 (Act No. 56 of 1974), or any other body which may be 
authorised by law to certify those tests or assessments.” 
The Act was amended by the deletion of the word “and” at the end of subsection (b) and the 
insertion of the word “and” at the end of subjection (c), so as to link it to the new subsection (d) 
as a minimum requirement for compliance with this section of the Act. This suggests that 
governments concern is not only with the scientific formulation and soundness of psychometric 
49 
 
assessments but due to their nature of psychometric evaluation there it also needs to ensure that it 
is medically sound, therefore countervailing with section 7 rights.  
There is no jurisprudence developed on psychometric evaluations however in Sidebeng District 
Municipality v SA Local Bargaining Council & others68an unfair labour practice claim was 
brought to the Commissions for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration by two employees 
regarding the fact that they had not been promoted. Before the interview process had begun all 
applicants underwent a competency and polygraph test, to which they had consented in writing. 
Also the candidates were all asked after the interview whether they objected to the competency 
and polygraph tests. The municipality argued that the polygraph was a reasonable and fair 
criterion to take into account when considering appointing. However the employees contended 
that the failure to pass the polygraph was the sole reason for their non-appointment. A witnesses 
on behalf of the municipality contended that the test was used to indicate honesty and integrity 
and would therefore be important enough to change a decision based on interview scores. The 
arbitrator found that the employees were more suitably qualified in terms of skills and experience 
than the employees appointed. He found that the employees were not appointed because they 
failed the polygraph test. The commissioner also found that to introduce the polygraph test as 
part of the criterion when it had not been advertised that applicants would need to undergo a 
polygraph test, was unfair. The commissioner then ordered the applicant to pay the employees 
the salaries and benefits that they would have received had they been appointed with effect from 
1 October 2007. On review however, the court agreed with the municipality’s reasoning that it 
was not obliged to spell out every aspect of the interview process in the advertisement. The court 
held that not every consideration that is taken into account needs to appear in the advertisement. 
However the court found that using a polygraph test as a basis for deceit in isolation of any other 
information placing a question mark over an individual’s integrity is unfair. The court found that 
it is certainly preferable to mention upfront a factor in the process that might disqualify a 
candidate. The court therefore found that the municipality had committed an unfair labour 
practice relating to promotion in relying exclusively on the result of a polygraph test to 
determine the honesty of candidates and made a subsequent order of compensation. Even though 
the use of polygraph testing is permitted, it is preferable to mention the testing as part of the 
                                               
68 Sidebeng District Municipality v South African Local Governing Bargaining Council and Others (JR 1559/09) 
[2012] ZALCJHB 45 (31 May 2012) 
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process to candidates upfront, and sole reliance on polygraph tests as the qualifying or 
disqualifying criteria in appointment and as a test of integrity is unfair.  
4.3 Criminal & credit checks 
Often times an employee’s reputation could have a knock on effect on the reputation of the 
employer. Therefore it is pertinent that prospective employees are forthcoming regarding any 
prior criminal records or in the case of financial position any credit judgments against them. This 
has a subsequent impact on the employer and puts a heavier burden on the employer to do all 
necessary checks on prospective employees to ensure information provided is true and correct as 
possible litigation to remedy where this action has not been taken is very costly.  
In Department of Home Affairs and Another v Ndlovu & others69Mr Ndlovu applied for a 
position at the applicant employer and presented in his CV that his degree was complete. 
However it later emerged that his degree was not complete and that he had only completed it 
some two years after applying for the position to which he was then subsequently appointed. The 
employee also signed a statement declaring that all information provided by him is complete and 
correct, and that he understands that any false information supplied could lead to his application 
being disqualified and his discharge if he is appointed. He was then subsequently charged with 
gross dishonesty, alternative gross negligence; misrepresentation; and a breach of the obligation 
of good faith, trust and confidence owed to the employer. The employee then contended that he 
had disclosed that he did not have the degree in his interview; he could not however explain why 
he had misrepresented this information in his CV. The employee then challenged his dismissal at 
the bargaining council, the arbitrator at the bargaining council found the dismissal to be fair. The 
Labour Court however found in favour of the employee, stating that it was clear from the 
evidence that the without a doubt the employee had disclosed to the panelists in the interview 
that he did not have a Bachelor of Technology Marketing Degree. The Labour Appeal Court 
however did not agree with the decision of the Labour Court finding that there was no evidence 
on which the Labour Court could rely to reach its conclusion and held that the misrepresentation 
was so serious that dismissal was a fair outcome. This indicates that misrepresentation by an 
employee of information relating to qualifications will be considered sufficient evidence upon 
which to sanction dismissal. This would be the case even if the employee has performed 
                                               
69 Department of Home Affairs and Another v Ndlovu and Others (DA11/2012)[2014]ZALAC 11 (27 March 2014) 
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effectively in the role according to the job standards, and it is only discovered at this later stage. 
The courts considers it to be the duty of the employer to provide evidence of such a claim unless 
it is proven based on the breach that dismissal is the only reasonable conclusion in the 
circumstance.   
In SAPS v Safety and Security Bargaining Council & others70an applicant for promotion was 
aggrieved at the fact that the candidate who had been successfully appointed to the position to 
which he had applied, did not disclose that he had a valid verbal warning on file. The successful 
candidate further advised that he had a clean disciplinary record during the period of his current 
rank. The aggrieved applicant found this non-disclosure to have compromised the selection 
panel’s ability to apply its mind to this aspect and therefore rendered the panel’s 
recommendation of the successful candidate invalid. The aggrieved applicant argued that this 
therefore constituted an unfair labour practice relating to promotion, which prejudiced his career 
progression within SAPS. The arbitrator found in favour of the applicant and found that SAPS 
had indeed committed an unfair labour practice and ordered SAPS to promote the grievant. The 
award was taken under review to the Labour Court where the presiding judge Cheadle set down 
compromising principles, these were: (a) There is no right to promotion in the ordinary course; 
only a right to be given a fair opportunity to compete for a post; (b) Any conduct that denies an 
employee the opportunity to compete for a post constitutes an unfair labour practice; (c) If the 
employee is not denied the opportunity of competing for a post then the only justification for 
scrutinizing the selection process is to determine whether the appointment was arbitrary or 
motivated by an unacceptable reason; (d) As long as the decision can be rationally justified, 
mistakes in the process of evaluation do not constitute unfairness justifying an interference with 
the decision to appoint; (e) As a general rule the appropriate remedy is to refer the decision back 
in order to allow the complainant a fair opportunity to compete. The only exception would be 
where there has been discrimination or victimization and where there are other compelling 
constitutional interests at stake or if the applicant proves that but for the unfair conduct; he or she 
would have been appointed. However in Noonan v Safety and Security Sectoral Bargaining 
Council and Others71 the judgement was taken on appeal at the Labour Appeal Court and the 
court disagreed with the principles laid down in the Labour Court judgment and found the 
                                               
70 SAPS v Safety and Security Bargaining Council & others (LC Case no: P426/08; judgment date 27/10/2010) 
71 Noonan v Safety and Security Sectoral Bargaining Council and Others (PA 1/11) [2012] ZALAC 9 (1 June 2012) 
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approach to the non-disclosure and its consequences were not material unless it affected the 
opportunity for promotion. The court held that this was not the case in this instance. The court 
found that where a candidate misleads a selection panel they prevent the panel from performing 
their task, that he or she defeats the purpose of having a selection panel and illegitimately 
advantages him or herself. This therefore also disadvantages all other candidates. The court 
therefore found that SAPS in failing to check the disciplinary record of the appointee and then 
appointing him constituted an unfair labour practice, and found that the aggrieved applicant 
should be compensated for the procedural unfairness. 
4.4 The consequences of fraud during the recruitment process 
There is a reasonable expectation from employers that the candidate applying for a role will 
provide the employer with accurate and truthful information. Such information as would be 
relevant to the decision to employ the individual. However this does not leave the employer 
completely off the hook in terms of doing relevant checks to verify information supplied by 
applicants.  
In Grobler v Anglo Platinum Frank Shaft72the applicant was previously employed by Impala 
Platinum Rustenburg. However, whilst in employment the applicant was charged with Gross 
Negligence in the performance of his duties which resulted in his dismissal from Impala 
Platinum. After his dismissal the applicant started his own business which he ran for a 12 month 
period. The applicant then approached an employee of Impala Platinum regarding whether there 
were any employment opportunities at Impala Platinum. This employee then asked the applicant 
for a copy of his CV which he could give to the mine overseer. The applicant did mention to this 
employee that he was previously dismissed from Impala Platinum. The applicant was advised 
after an interview and his application for employment that he was successful. After signing his 
offer of employment and attending Induction the applicant returned to his shaft. Whilst attending 
to administration requirements related to the applicants employment it was discovered that the 
applicant was previously dismissed from Impala Platinum. The applicant was then informed that 
his employment would not be processed and that he needs to report to the human resources 
department. The applicant was then informed that his employment was withdrawn due to his 
failure to disclose important information regarding his disciplinary record with Impala mine. The 
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applicant the referred an unfair dismissal dispute to the CCMA. A witness testifying on behalf of 
the respondent advised that at the interview the applicant was asked why he had left his previous 
employment to which the applicant had answered that he was looking for better opportunities. 
Additional witnesses under cross examination confirmed that the applicant had the opportunity to 
disclose the fact that he was dismissed from Impala Platinum but failed to do so. It was held that 
for various reasons there were procedural defects regarding the procedure followed by the 
employer prior to dismissing the applicant. The arbitrator found that the dismissal was 
procedurally unfair but substantively fair. The reason for the finding of substantive fairness is 
because the applicant had failed to disclose vitally important information regarding the 
termination of his employment with his previous employer. Despite the arbitrator finding that the 
dismissal was procedurally unfair the arbitrator did not award compensation because against the 
background of the applicant being the architect of his own fate he is therefore not entitled to any 
compensation.  
It is therefore important that employers always follow due process in verifying all information 
supplied by applicants, and that should they fail to do that, in remedying this failure the employer 
must follow due procedure as it relates to discipline and give the applicant a fair opportunity to 




Chapter 5:  The legal contract of employment 
Following the interview process a contract of employment is entered into between the employer 
and the successful applicant. A lack of certainty or clarity in this contract can result in future 
disputes.  For example in MOSSAWU on behalf of Two Members and Jet Store Menlyn (2006) 27 
ILJ 2743 (CCMA) the applicants were not provided with particulars of their employment in 
writing, as required by s 29 of the BCEA 1997. The commissioner accepted that they were 
justified in believing that they had been properly employed and would receive pay at the rate of 
casual workers. To avoid such disputes it is important that there is understanding about this 
phase of the process. 
 
5.1 Legal requirements for the formation of a lawful contract of employment 
 
Every employer is required by law, according to section 29 of the BCEA, to provide the 
employee with written particulars of employment no later than the first day of commencement of 
employment. Although this is obligatory, the BCEA provides for no remedy as s 93 does not 
include a breach of s 29 as an offence. It would seem that the only remedy for breach of s 29 is 
for an aggrieved employee to refer an unfair labour dispute to the CCMA or bargaining council. .  
 
 5.1.1 What has to be agreed? 
 
In Jack v Direction-General Department of Environmental Affairs73the court held the following: 
‘Historically, the requirements for a contract of employment were derived from the statutory 
definition of “employee”. It is logical to follow that approach as there cannot be a contract of 
employment unless the parties thereto are employer and employee either at common law or as 
defined in statutes. At common law, a contract of employment (locio condition operarum) was 
a consensual contract whereby an employee undertook to place his personal services for a 
certain period of time at the disposal of an employer who in turn undertook to pay him the 
wages or salary agreed upon in consideration for his services.”74 
 
Section 29 of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act specifies that the employer must provide 
the employee with the following in writing at the commencement of employment: 
 
(a) the full name and address of the employer;  
                                               
73 [2003] 1BLLR 28 (LC) at paras 11-12 
74 As was expressed in Smith v Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner 1979 (1) SA 51 (A) at 56E-F 
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(b) the name and occupation of the employee, or a brief description of the work for which 
the employee is employed;  
(c) the place of work, and, where the employee is required or permitted to work at various 
places, an indication of this;  
(d) the date on which the employment began;  
(e) the employee’s ordinary hours of work and days of work;  
(f) the employee’s wage or the rate and method of calculating wages;  
(g) the rate of pay for overtime work;  
(h) any other cash payments that the employee is entitled to;  
(i) any payment in kind that the employee is entitled to and the value of the payment in kind; 
(j) how frequently remuneration will be paid;  
(k) any deductions to be made from the employee’s remuneration;  
(l) the leave to which the employee is entitled;  
(m) the period of notice required to terminate employment, or if employment is for a 
specified period, the date when employment is to terminate;75  
(n) a description of any council or sectoral determination which covers the employer’s 
business;  
(o) any period of employment with a previous employer that counts towards the employee’s 
period of employment;  
(p) a list of any other documents that form part of the contract of employment, indicating a 
place that is reasonably accessible to the employee where a copy of each may be obtained. 
 
By signing the contract of employment the employee then agrees to the terms and conditions as 
set out from point (a) to (p) as these are statutory elements that need to be agreed upon by both 
parties and therefore serves as a tool to regulate the relationship. 
 
                                               
75 In Hamandawana v Dispute Resolution Centre & others (2014) 35 ILJ 1312 (LC) the court considered the 
provisions of the BCEA and found that the Act did not deem indefinite employment to be the normal type of 
employment relationship in the absence of a written agreement stating otherwise. The Act was neutral on the 
question, leaving it for the parties to determine.  
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In Wyeth v Manqele76the main issues which the court held that needed to be decided upon was 
whether a contract of employment existed and whether the respondent was an employee. In 
determining whether a contract existed the court cited the parole evidence rule which states: 
“when a contract has been reduced to writing, the writing is in general regarded as the 
exclusive  memorial of the transaction and no evidence to prove its terms may be given save the 
document or secondary evidence of its contents, nor may the contents of such documents be 
contradicted, altered, added to or varied…”77  
The court however found that, that did not in any way materially change the purpose of the 
contract and found that a contract had definitely been concluded when the appellant defaulted 
before the commencement date. The court relied on the definition of employee in s 213 of the 
LRA and read that right in conjunction with section 23 of the Constitution. After perusal of 
previous statutes’ definitions of employee it was found that it was not contemplated that a person 
became an employee only after they commenced employment.78 Also 
Section 186(1)(a) defines “dismissal” as meaning that – 
“. . . an employer has terminated a contract of employment with or without notice . . .” 79. The 
ultimate conclusion arrived at by the court was that section 213 of the LRA definition of 
employee “can be read to include a person or persons who has or have concluded a contract or 
contracts of employment the commencement of which is or are deferred to a future date or 
dates.”80.  
 
In Mokethi v General Public Service Sectoral Bargaining Council and others81 the court found 
that in order to establish whether an employment contract existed the first question to be asked is 
whether the applicant by definition could be seen as an employee. Section 213 of the LRA 
defines an ‘employee’ as:  
‘(a) any person, excluding an independent contractor, who works for another person or for the 
State and who receives, or is entitled to receive, any remuneration; and (b) Any other person 
who in any manner assists in carrying on or conducting the business of the employer.’ 
                                               
76 Wyeth SA (Pty) Ltd v Manqele & others [2005] 6 BLLR 523 LAC  
77 see Union Agreement v Vianini Pipes (Pty) Ltd 1941 AD 34 at 47 
78 See S 1(a) of the Labour Relations Act 2 of 1983 
79 Wyeth SA (Pty) Ltd v Manqele & others [2005] 6 BLLR 523 LAC at para 26 
80 Ibid para 52 
81 Mokheti v General Public Service Sectoral Bargaining Council & others [2011] LC, JR 1563/10 
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The court found that it was irrelevant that the applicant reported to the station and received a 
uniform and attended induction, received an appointment card and was introduced to the other 
staff, as the existence of a contract or acceptance of an offer had not been established.82 The 
court came to this conclusion because the post to which the applicant had allegedly been 
appointed had not been advertised neither had any application been received for it. This went 
against all procedures set down in the Public Service Act, 1994 which prescribes preemptory 
processes for appointment which include advertisement and selection processes. The court 
accepted the general principle of the common law that a contract need not be reduced to writing 
in order to be binding. The court found that the applicant did not discharge the onus and failed to 
show any elements of an alleged oral agreement. The court found that typical elements of a 
contract would be salary and benefits offered, commencement date of the agreement and the job 
description and found that the applicant showed none of that. This illustrates that in order to 
prove that the status of employee exists without a written contract, the individual at least needs to 
prove that a certain salary had been offered or paid and that they had been employed to fulfill a 
certain function or job, and that there was a specified date upon which they would assume their 
duties.  
 
 5.1.2 In what form must the agreement be? 
 
Section 200A of the Labour Relations Act states that a person working for or rendering a service 
to another is presumed to be an employee regardless of the form of the contract if one or more of 
the following factors are present: 
(a) the manner in which the person works is subject to the control or direction of another 
person;   
(b) the person's hours of work are subject to the control or direction of another person;   
(c) in the case of a person who works for an organisation, the person forms part of that 
organisation;   
(d) the person has worked for that other person for an average of at least 40 hours per month 
over the last three months;   
(e) the person is economically dependent on the other person for whom he or she works or 
renders services;   
(f) the person is provided with tools of trade or work equipment by the other person; or   
(g) the person only works for or renders services to one person. 
 
                                               
82 See para 40 
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However the Act also states that an exception to the above exists where an individual earns 
higher than the threshold as contemplated by Section 6(3) of the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act.  
 
The only manner in which an employer would be able to rebut that an individual is an employee, 
is by showing that even though the individual fits into one of the categories in section 200A that 
the individual is in fact an independent contractor. In SABC v Mckenzie83it was held that the 
following are the features of a genuine independent contractor: 
a. specified work is done or a specified result is produced (as opposed to an employee who 
renders personal services); 
b. the independent contractor is not obliged to perform the work personally, unless 
specifically agreed upon (as opposed to an employee who is at the beck and call of the 
employer to render personal services); 
c. the independent contractor is bound to produce the contractual work (as opposed to an 
employee who may be told by the employer that it does not want services to be rendered); 
d. the independent contractor is notionally on the same footing as the employer (as opposed 
to an employee who is subordinate to the will of the employer); 
e. the death of the independent contractor does not necessarily terminate the contract of 
work (as opposed to the death of an employee, which terminates the employment 
contract); 
f. a contract of work terminates when the work is completed (as opposed to a contract of 
employment which terminates on the expiration of the period of service). 84 
If the above characteristics are proved to be present then the employer would have successfully 
rebutted the section 200A presumption.  
 
In Palmer and AAA Speedy Locksmith85the applicant signed an agreement with the respondent 
nominating him as the preferred supplier of locksmith services on behalf of the respondent in the 
Durban area. The applicant worked for the respondent approximately two hours a day and was 
allowed to perform work for other companies as well. The applicant also determined the fees 
payable by clients and provided invoices on the respondent’s invoices and was then subsequently 
paid a percentage of turnover.  The applicant complained that he needed to be on call 24 hours 
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but that he did not receive enough work to compensate for this. Some negotiations took place but 
no new contract was signed. The applicant’s services were subsequently terminated and he then 
claimed he had been unfairly dismissed. In the arbitrator’s award he found that the applicant 
earned more than the amount stipulated in section 6(3) of the BCEA and the presumption of 
employment as contained in section 200A of the LRA did not apply to the applicant. The 
arbitrator also summarized the following regarding his findings on the nature of the contract: 
(a) the applicant determines what to charge the customer and earns a percentage of the 
charge, he therefore does not earn a set wage; 
(b) the applicant is not supervised by the respondent as the respondent is based in another 
city to the respondent; 
(c) although the applicant drove a company vehicle it was a vehicle which he rented from the 
company; and 
(d) the  need to be available 24 hours had to do with the nature of the business in that he 
needed to assist a customer when a problem arose and neither party could foresee when 
and if a problem would arise. 
In light of the above reasons the arbitrator found the applicant was not an employee of the 
respondent. The reasons detailed by the arbitrator also effectively rebutted the section 200A 
requirements rebutting points (a), (d), (e), (f) & (g). The agreement needs to be in a form which 
cannot be challenged by section 200A of the LRA, as section 200A only requires one or more of 
the factors listed are present for the presumption that the individual is an employee to be 
rebutted.  
 
 5.1.3 Consequences of an illegal / unlawful contract 
In Kylie v CCMA86 the appellant, a sex worker, after being dismissed without a prior hearing 
lodged a claim of unfair dismissal with the CCMA. A dispute regarding the jurisdiction of the 
CCMA was referred to the Labour Court. The Labour Court found the employment contract to 
be illegal, in the sense that the activity performed by the individual is an illegal activity in terms 
of the Sexual Offences Act 23 of 1957. Section 3(a) and (c) of this Act makes brothel keeping a 
criminal offence and includes persons who reside in a brothel and share in any monies taken 
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there in. Section 20(1)(a) of the Act states that unlawful carnal intercourse for reward constitutes 
a criminal offence which attracts a criminal penalty of imprisonment of no more than three years 
and a fine of no more than R6000. The court a quo invoked the principle  
ex turpi cause non oritur action which ‘prohibits the enforcement of immoral or illegal 
contracts’. Thus, if a contract is illegal, courts must regard the contract as void and hence 
unenforceable.87 
Regarding whether this limited an individual’s section 23 Constitutional right to fair labour 
practices, the court a quo found that an individual engaged in illegal employment would not be 
granted such right as it would undermine a fundamental constitutional value of the rule of law by 
sanctioning or encouraging legally prohibited activity. However in the Labour Appeal Court it 
was found that the term ‘everyone’ in section 23(1) of the Constitution follows on the wording in 
section 7(1) which provides that the Bill of Rights enshrines the right of ‘all people in the 
country’ and therefore supports a broad approach to the scope of the right guaranteed in the 
Constitution. The court referred to Khosa v Minister of Social Development88in which the 
following statement was made: 
“The word ‘everyone’ is a term of general import and unrestricted meaning. It means what it 
conveys. Once the state puts in place a social welfare system, everyone has a right to have 
access to that system.”89 
The appeal succeeded on the basis that the court found the applicant to meet the threshold 
requirements to receive protection in terms of the section 23 Constitutional rights.  
What becomes clear from the Kylie judgment is that even where a contract is by definition is 
illegal the question of consequences then rests on whether there was an employment relationship 
and in terms of that relationship the employee therefore falls within the scope of the Labour 
Relations Act. Also one would need to consider whether there was a breach of the individual’s 
constitutional right(s). The mere existence of the right to fair labour practices trumps the 
existence of an illegal contract if fair labour practices had not been followed.   
The Employment Services Act 14 of 2014 (ESA) became operational on 9 August 2015.  One of the 
features of this Act which will impact on employers immediately is Section 8. In terms of this 
section no employer may employ a foreign national within RSA prior to such foreign national 
                                               
87 Ibid para 7 
88 Khosa v Minister of Social Development [2004] ZACC 11; 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC)  
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producing an applicable and valid work permit, issued in terms of the Immigration Act. 
Regulations will be forthcoming to require employers to satisfy themselves that there are no 
other persons in SA with suitable skills to fill a vacancy, before recruiting a foreign national. The 
preparation of a skills transfer plan by employers in respect of any position in which a foreign 
national is employed will also be include in the Regulations. 
ESA does offer some protection to foreign nationals: An employee who is employed without a 
valid work permit is entitled to enforce any claim that the employee may have in terms of any 
statute or employment relationship against his or her employer or any person who is liable in 
terms of the law. This codifies the law established in Southern Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) Ltd iro 
Southern Sun Waterfront Hotel v CCMA & others (LC Case No: C255/09; C362/09; Date of 
judgment: 21 June 2011) which held that an "illegal foreigner" (or undocumented immigrant) is 
an employee for the purposes of the LRA. Even where the work itself is illegal and not only the 
contract of employment, the CCMA retains jurisdiction. 
 
5.2 How must acceptance of the contract be made? 
An individual can knowingly and willingly accept certain terms of a contract, or in contrast be 
coerced into signing a contract which they do not understand. In the latter instance determining 
the true nature of that contract would have to be tested against the statute and relevant 
jurisprudence on the matter. The submission behind this is that even though an employer may 
have an individual sign a contract specifying that the nature of the relationship is not that of an 
employment relationship just because the individual accepts this in writing by signing the 
contract, it still does not necessarily mean that, that individual is classified as an independent 
contractor. 
In Shezi & another v Gees Shoes90the applicants referred a dispute alleging that they had been 
unfairly dismissed. The respondent rebutted the dismissal stating that the applicants were 
independent contractors and therefore not employees. The duties of the applicants entailed 
checking the soles used in the manufacture of shoes and after checking repacking them in boxes 
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and placing them in a store room.  The arbitrator drew the following conclusions after evaluating 
the facts: 
“1   The applicants are provided their tools of the trade by the respondent, namely the tables 
and the premises in which to work. If it were not for the provision of these tables and premises 
by the respondent, the applicant would have no means of production. 
2   The respondent controls the applicants in the sense that it designates what it is they do, 
where they do it, and how they do it. The applicants corroborated each other in respect of the 
duties of Ivan, the supervisor, and the uncorroborated testimony of Mr Sivasunker in this 
regard must be rejected. 
3   The applicants presented invoices for payment, but it was clear that this was a clumsy 
attempt to circumvent the definition of remuneration in the Act, with the parties to the 
transaction rather regarding the payments made as salary in its ordinary sense. 
4   The applicants have placed their entire productive capacity in the hands of the respondent, 
and are not allowed to market their services anywhere else. 
5   The applicants are not regarded as separate business entities or juristic persons, either in 
terms of labour law or income tax law, and the only reason that the respondent did not deduct 
PAYE in respect of the applicants was that there wages were too pitiful to qualify for taxation. 
Even the receiver balks at taxing starvation wages.”91 
Based on the above summarized facts the arbitrator found that the applicants had successfully 
proved on a balance of probabilities that they were employees as defined by section 213 of the 
LRA, and were therefore entitled to protection under the Act. The arbitrator also found that the 
employees were dismissed as contemplated under section 186(a) of the Act and discharged the 
onus imposed on them by section 192(1) of the Act, in that they proved the existence of their 
dismissal. The arbitrator found the dismissals to be both procedurally and substantively unfair 
and awarded compensation.   
However in Callanan v Tee-Kee Borehole Casings (Pty) Ltd & another92 the applicant had 
resigned from the respondents and commenced to render services for the respondents through the 
medium of a Close Corporation. Although the applicant had formed the close corporation to ease 
                                               
91 Ibid p1715  
92 Callanan v Tee-Kee Borehole Casings (Pty) Ltd & another (1992) 13 ILJ (IC) 
63 
 
his tax burden the Close Corporation was actively engaged in business of the applicant’s own 
accord and the business was not therefore just merely a medium through which the applicant’s 
remuneration was paid. Upon reviewing the financial takings of the Close Corporation it was 
found that only 22% of the gross sales turnover for the year was derived from earning taken from 
the respondent, the applicant could therefore not claim that he was economically dependent on 
the respondent as he had other avenues of income into his business.93  The court found that the 
applicant was an employee of his Close Corporation and not of the respondent and therefore was 
not entitled to relief in terms of section 46(9) of the LRA.  
The employer’s prerogative has been restricted to a large degree in the formation and content of 
employment contracts. It has even been restricted in whether or not it as the employer deems the 
relationship to be that of an employment relationship. The law limits what needs to be agreed 
and also governs who would receive protection from the law and goes as far as to protect 
employees in illegal contract as sees in Kylie v CCMA94 
 
Chapter 6:  Conclusion 
 The law of Master and Servant, derived from an exploitative, colonial and classist world, 
entrenched managerial prerogative. This facilitated appointment and dismissal at will, overriding 
notions of fairness and equity. Strydom95 submits: 
The common law's subscribing to the concept of freedom of contract which allows the employer 
to discriminate when selecting people for employment, brings it into direct conflict with the 
Constitution which specifically prohibits unfair discrimination on arbitrary grounds such as 
race and gender. In addition, the common law's emphasis on lawfulness, which is particularly 
evident in the employer's right to dismiss by merely giving the required notice, is contrary to the 
Constitution which affords everyone the right to fair labour practices in the conduct of labour 
                                               
93 Ibid p1551 
94 Kylie v Commission for Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration and Others (CA 10/08)[2010] ZALAC 8; 2010 (4) 
SA 383 (LAC) 





relations.  Clearly, legislation was necessary to bring the employment relationship in line with 
the Constitution and to address the unequal bargaining power between the parties.96 
Legislation however has taken cognizance of the unequal bargaining relationship between 
employer and employee and has placed limitations and has sought to prevent the exploitation of 
employees and promote job security.  Strydom submits that one of the forms that statutory 
limitations take is that it regulates the employer’s ability to enter into contracts of employment. 
The employer still reserves the right of whom they will employ, as long as it they are not 
statutorily prohibited from doing so or required to employ other applicants.  
One area where an employer’s prerogative is intact is in the area of economic interest of the 
business. For instance an employer is not prohibited from deciding how much staff it needs to 
employ in relation to the size of its business. It also is able to choose and the roles which the 
organization requires in order for its operation to run effectively. The employer regulates 
working time, when employees will be able to take meal intervals and any annual leave, by 
agreement with the employee; however it goes without saying that the employer sets the tone of 
such agreement.  
When determining which candidate to employ an employer needs to be able to prove that they 
had selected the most suitably qualified individual and if they had not their reason should be 
based on either the fact that the individual appointed would be able to acquire the skills and 
experience in a reasonable time, or the individual meets their quota requirements in terms of their 
employment equity plan. The employer’s prerogative in recruitment has also been significantly 
restricted in that applicants for employment are now also considered employees under the EEA. 
However where employers maintain prerogative is that decisions are generally made 
confidentially and in the case of targeted selection it does not curb the panel from discussing who 
their favorite is prior to the interview process starting and therefore “rigging” the scores in favor 
of the said candidate.  
What is evident however is that courts do not want to get involved in appointing applicants and 
overriding employment decisions which involve the promotion of staff. The courts would instead 
review the process and then refer the matter back to the employer instead of telling the employer 
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which candidate to employ. So for the most part it seems that the biggest area in which an 
employer’s prerogative regarding who they would prefer to promote has remained intact, as long 
as it is fair and justifiable in law, as per Section 187 of the LRA. Failures by the employer to 
prove its decision as fair and justifiable will result in it losing an unfair labour practice suit. 
Decisions made by employers need to conform to standards set in the constitution and all other 
labour legislation and not by any means discriminate. Employer prerogative has specifically been 
eradicated in the area of discrimination. Our statutes take a specifically hard line against any 
form of discrimination whether direct or indirect and even more so for discrimination on any of 
the listed grounds.  Employers however could use this very principle to justify discrimination 
against certain race groups not contained in the definition of designated groups of such 
individuals do not address quota requirements as set out in their employment equity plan.  
Recruitment and promotion in employment is a widely regulated area in the law and employer’s 
cognizance must be drawn to compliance. Redressing past injustices and eradicating any form of 
discrimination is at the height of the agenda with regard to limiting the employer’s prerogative. 
When all is said and done the employer does effectively have the final say on all recruitment and 
promotion decisions but in order to steer clear of reputation destroying lawsuits it is in the best 
interest of the employer to comply with the law in this area and instead work with the principles 
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